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ABSTRACT
Regulating and Securing the Interfaces Across Mobile Apps, OS and Users
by
Huan Feng
Chair: Kang G. Shin
Over the past decade, we have seen a swift move towards a mobile-centered world.
This thriving mobile ecosystem builds upon the interplay of three important parties:
the mobile user, OS, and app. These parties interact via designated interfaces many
of which are newly invented for, or introduced to the mobile platform. Nevertheless,
as these new ways of interactions arise in the mobile ecosystem, what is enabled by
these communication interfaces often violates the expectations of the communicating
parties. This makes the foundation of the mobile ecosystem untrustworthy, causing
significant security and privacy hazards. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by:
1) securing the conversations between trusted parties, 2) regulating the interactions
between partially trusted parties, and 3) protecting the communications between
untrusted parties.
We first deal with the case of mobile OS and app, and analyze the Inter-Process
Communication (IPC) protocol (Android Binder in particular) between these two
untrusted parties. We found that the Android OS is frequently making unrealistic
assumptions on the validity (sanity) of transactions from apps, thus creating signif-
icant security hazards. We analyzed the root cause of this emerging attack surface
xiii
and protected this interface by developing an effective, precautionary testing frame-
work and a runtime diagnostic tool. Then, we study the deficiency of how a mobile
user interacts with an app that he can only partially trust. In the current mobile
ecosystem, information about the same user in different apps can be easily shared
and aggregated, which clearly violates the conditional trust mobile user has on each
app. This issue is addressed by providing two complementary options: an OS-level
extension that allows the user to track and control, during runtime, the potential flow
of his information across apps; and a user-level solution that allows the users to main-
tain multiple isolated profiles for each app. Finally, we elaborate on how to secure
the voice interaction channel between two trusted parties, mobile user and OS. The
open nature of the voice channel makes applications that depend on voice interac-
tions, such as voice assistants, difficult to secure and exposed to various attacks. We
solve this problem by proposing the first system, called VAuth, that provides contin-
uous and usable authentication for voice commands, designed as a wearable security
token. It collects the body-surface vibrations of a user via an accelerometer and con-
tinuously matches them to the voice commands received by the voice assistant. This
way, VAuth guarantees that the voice assistant executes only the commands that
originate from the voice of the owner.
Overall, this thesis examined the privacy and security issues across various in-
terfaces in the mobile ecosystem, analyzed the trust relationship between different
parties and proposed practical solutions. It also documented the experience learned
from tackling these problems, and can serve as a reference in dealing with similar




During the past decade, we have witnessed a swift move towards a mobile-centered
world. In the U.S, the majority of all digital media consumption now takes place
in the mobile ecosystem [67], and a typical smartphone user spends more than 3.5
hours per day on its smartphone device. Most of the time (more than 80 percent)
is consumed purely on mobile apps [50] and this mobile experience is taking over
every aspect of our digital life. For a large percentage of population in developing
countries, a smartphone is their first and only access to the Internet, and becomes
the daily vehicle of their payments, health, and even political systems.
Compared to traditional computing devices, such as desktops and laptops, a
smartphone has several unique properties which make its security and privacy more
critical. First, the smartphone is always connected to the Internet and always pos-
sessed by the user, which enables continuous user tracking and profiling. Second,
the smartphone is rarely shared among different users, making it the very hub for
personal information and activities. Third, the smartphone is equipped with various
sensors, and can thus see/feel the user’s physical environment. All of these make the
smartphone an attractive target of attacks.
The mobile privacy and security issues are further aggravated by the prosperity
and controversy of the mobile app ecosystem. As of the end of 2016, there are more
1
than 2 million apps available for download in Apple’s App Store and Google Play,
respectively. Anyone can also become a developer of these apps, with a deployment
fee of as low as $25, and deploy their apps at a global scale. These developers can be
inexperienced, careless or even malicious, posing great threats to smartphone users
and their information. Moreover, in some countries or areas of the world, there is no
centralized app store and users can only download apps from untrusted sources and
have to deal with hundreds of third-party app stores.
All of these challenges and threats make trust a complicated issue in the cur-
rent mobile ecosystem. Different parties need to interact in a way that both fulfills
the functional needs of each other and at the same time be aware of the potential
hostility between themselves and from others. Nevertheless, we find that as more
communication and interaction interfaces are introduced to the mobile ecosystem,
what is enabled by these interfaces often fails to comply with the trust relationship
between the two communicating parties. This makes the foundation of the mobile
ecosystem untrustworthy and results in significant security and privacy hazards. In
this chapter, we present an overview of the mobile ecosystem, analyze the trust rela-
tionship between different parties, describe the urgent problems to be addressed and
summarize our approaches to resolving these issues.
1.1 An Overview of the Mobile Ecosystem
The mobile ecosystem centers around three parties: mobile user, OS, and app (see
Fig. 1.1). The OS provides a set of API abstractions that app developers can directly
work with. These APIs drive the hardware sensors, system UIs and networking and
storage interfaces. This way, the app developer can focus on implementing the logic of
the apps, instead of being burdened with system/hardware details. User installs apps
on the smartphone OS, either manually, or through some centralized or third-party
app store. These app stores serve as the delivery channel for mobile apps and the first
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Figure 1.1: An overview of the mobile ecosystem.
defense line against malicious app contents. When the user interacts with an app, his
usage behavior and other personal information will be collected, sent to the cloud,
and then analyzed. In some cases, this is legitimate because most apps are merely
UI abstractions and local content cache, while the actual functional logic resides in
the cloud. Examples of these apps cover the categories of shopping, news, and social
networks. However, in many cases, this tracking process is purely for advertising
purposes. The major monetization channel for mobile apps is by incorporating third-
party ad libraries which collect user demographics, locations, and behaviors, and
enable more targeted advertising.
The dynamics of the mobile ecosystem becomes interesting when considering the
trust relationship between these parties:
• OS does not trust apps. Apps running in an OS can be buggy or malicious,
and hence a modern smartphone OS typically enforces a sandbox environment
for the app’s execution. Apps can only interface with APIs exported by the
OS and extensive sanity checks are deployed around these APIs. In both An-
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Figure 1.2: The trust relationship between three parties in the mobile ecosystem.
droid and iOS, sensitive APIs are guarded by a permission model. Each app
needs to explicitly declare the permissions it requires to fulfill its functionalities.
Specifically, Apple’s iOS adopts a runtime permission model where the user will
be prompted the first time when app tries to access certain resources, while
Android adopted an install-time permission model, which requires all requested
permissions to be reviewed during install-time. The runtime permission model
is generally believed to be more effective than install-time enforcements, and
the latest Android OS (6.0) has already made the switch to the former.
• User partially trusts apps. The user has to trust the app to some extent
if (s)he needs the service provided by the app. It is impossible for the app
to provide any useful service unless it acquires the necessary information. For
example, if the user wants to purchase some products via a shopping app,
information about the purchased items is unavoidably shared with this app.
Nevertheless, the trust the user has on an app is not unconditional — he only
trusts it with the information related to (generated in) the app. The user may
trust a map app with his location traces, but will not trust it with his financial
information or contact history.
• User trusts OS. The user needs to have a complete trust of the mobile OS.
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In fact, if the OS is mal-intented (for example, in the case of a user installing
malicious third-party ROM), any information stored or generated in the smart-
phone is inherently insecure. The user mostly interacts with OS through a touch
screen or physical keyboard, but also starts to embrace a voice interaction chan-
nel. This is largely due to the increasing popularity of mobile voice assistant,
such as Siri and Google Now. It is important to ensure the integrity of these
interaction surfaces is not compromised, making sure the trust relationship be-
tween mobile OS and the user is not exploited.
1.2 Problems
This dissertation investigates the cross-party interfaces in the current mobile
ecosystem. Many of these interfaces are either newly invented for, or introduced
to the mobile world and does not fit the complicated trust relationship across parties.
This dissertation aims to identify these gaps and 1) secure the conversations between
trusted parties, 2) regulate the interactions between partially trusted parties, and 3)
protect the communications between untrusted parties. Specifically, it focuses on the
following problems.
1.2.1 Insecure Client-side IPCs
First, we deal with the case of two opposing parties, mobile OS and app, and
analyze the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) protocol between them. In Android,
communications between apps and system services are supported by a transaction-
based IPC mechanism. Binder, as the cornerstone of this IPC mechanism, separates
two communicating parties as client and server. As with any client–server model, the
server should not make any assumption on the validity (sanity) of client-side trans-
actions. To our surprise, this principle is found to have frequently been overlooked
in the implementation of Android system services. We want to find why develop-
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ers keep making this seemingly simple mistake and how to defend against emerging
vulnerabilities on this attack surface.
1.2.2 Unregulated Cloud-side Profiling
Then, we study the deficiency of existing mobile user interactions with apps, the
party that he can only partially trust. From the user’s perspective, his behaviors in
different smartphone apps capture different views of his life, and are largely inde-
pendent of each other. These views are supposed to be kept as ‘isolated islands’ of
information and stored separately. However, in the current mobile app ecosystem, a
curious party can covertly link and aggregate usage behaviors of the same user across
different apps. In fact, once the users’ behavioral information is at the apps’ hands, it
may be shared or leaked in an arbitrary way without the users’ control or consent. We
refer to this as unregulated aggregation of app-usage behaviors. How to characterize
and further reduce this threat remains a question to be answered.
1.2.3 Unprotected Voice Interaction Channel
Last, we turn our attention to the voice interaction channel between two trusted
parties, mobile user and OS. Voice has become an increasingly popular User Inter-
action (UI) channel, largely contributing to the ongoing trend of wearables, smart
vehicles, and home automation systems. Voice assistants such as Siri, Google Now,
and Cortana, have become our everyday fixtures, especially in scenarios where touch
interfaces are inconvenient or even dangerous to use, such as driving or exercising.
Nevertheless, the open nature of the voice channel makes voice assistants difficult to
secure and exposed to various attacks as demonstrated by security researchers. We
would like to secure this open communication channel and fortify the trust relation-
ship between mobile OS and user.
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1.3 Contributions
This dissertation proposes practical solutions for the aforementioned problems.
For each problem, we elaborate on the attack vector, assess its current status, and
develop deployable solutions that can effectively resolve the attack surface and raise
the awareness of the developers/users.
1.3.1 Understanding and Defending the Binder Attack Surface
We identified and studied more than 100 vulnerabilities on the Binder attack sur-
face. We analyzed these vulnerabilities to find that most of them are rooted at a
common confusion of where the actual security boundary is among system devel-
opers. We thus highlight the deficiency of testing only on client-side public APIs
and argue for the necessity of testing and protection on the Binder interface — the
actual security boundary. Specifically, we design and implement BinderCracker, an
automatic testing framework that supports context-aware fuzzing and actively man-
ages the dependency between transactions. It does not require the source codes of the
component under test, is compatible with services in different layers, and performs 7x
better than simple black-box fuzzing. We also call attention to the attack attribution
problem for IPC-based attacks. The lack of OS-level support makes it very difficult
to identify the culprit apps even for developers with adb access. We address this issue
by providing an informative runtime diagnostic tool that tracks the origin, scheme,
content, and parsing details of each failed transaction. This brings transparency into
the IPC process and provides an essential step for other in-depth analysis or forensics.
1.3.2 Reducing Unregulated Aggregation Across App Usage Behaviors
We present a fresh perspective of unregulated aggregation, focusing on monitoring,
characterizing and reducing the underlying linkability across apps. The cornerstone of
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our study is the Dynamic Linkability Graph (DLG) which tracks app-level linkability
during runtime. We observed how DLG evolves on real-world users and identified
real-world evidence of apps abusing IPCs and OS-level identifying information to
establish linkability. Based on these observations, we propose a linkability-aware
extension to current mobile operating systems, called LinkDroid, which provides
runtime monitoring and mediation of linkability across different apps. LinkDroid is
a client-side solution and compatible with the existing smartphone ecosystem. It helps
end-users “sense” this emerging threat and provides them intuitive opt-out options.
1.3.3 Enabling Unlinkability of Mobile Apps in User-level
Though the threat of unregulated aggregation is prevalent and severe, existing
mobile OS vendors may be unlikely to adopt changes/extensions that can improve
the privacy of users. This is due to a conflict of interest because the entire mobile
ecosystem is fueled by the abundance of user information. To bridge this gap, we
propose Mask, the first user-level solution that allows the user to negotiate to what
extent his behavior can be linked and aggregated. Specifically, Mask introduces a set
of private execution modes that allow the users to maintain multiple isolated profiles
for each app. Each app profile can be temporary, being recycled after each session, or
enduring, persists across multiple sessions. By enabling the private execution modes
which isolate app usages at this very source, Mask provides a client-side solution
without requiring any change to the existing ecosystem.
1.3.4 Continuous Authentication for Voice Assistants
We developed VAuth, the first system that provides continuous and usable au-
thentication for voice assistants. We design VAuth to fit in various widely-adopted
wearable devices, such as eyeglasses, earphones/buds and necklaces, where it collects
the body-surface vibrations of the user and matches it with the speech signal re-
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ceived by the voice assistant’s microphone. VAuth guarantees that the voice assistant
executes only the commands that originate from the voice of the owner. We have
evaluated VAuth with 18 users and 30 voice commands and find it to achieve an al-
most perfect matching accuracy with less than 0.1% false positive rate, regardless of
VAuth’s position on the body and the user’s language, accent or mobility. VAuth suc-
cessfully thwarts different practical attacks, such as replayed attacks, mangled voice
attacks, or impersonation attacks. It also has low energy and latency overheads and
is compatible with most existing voice assistants.
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CHAPTER II
Understanding and Defending the Android Binder
Attack Surface
2.1 Introduction
Android is the most popular smartphone OS and dominates the global market with
a share of more than 82% [97]. By the end of 2015, the total number of Android devices
surpassed 1.4 billion, and more than 1.6 million mobile apps were available in Google
Play for download [43, 83]. The developers of these apps are not always trustworthy;
many of them might be inexperienced, careless or even malicious. Therefore, proper
isolation between apps and the system is essential for robustness and security.
To meet this requirement, apps in Android execute in the application sandboxes.
They depend on Inter-Process Communications (IPCs) extensively to interact with
the system and other apps. Binder, as the cornerstone of this IPC mechanism, has
long been believed as one of the most secure/robust components in Android. How-
ever, during the past year, there have been multiple CVE (Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures) reports discussing attacks exploiting the Binder interface [24–27, 87].
Interestingly, none of these attacks tries to undermine the security of Binder driver,
but instead use Binder only as an attack gateway (entry point). A careful examina-
tion of the attack surface has led us to the discovery of the fundamental cause of this
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attack vector: an attacker can directly inject faulty transactions into system services
by manipulating the Binder interface, and hence bypass all client-side sanity checks.
Theoretically, this should not be an issue — a system service should not hinge on the
validity of client-side transactions, and should always be robust on its own. However,
we found that this principle has frequently been overlooked in the implementation
of many Android system services, which led us to the following questions: why do
system developers keep on making this seemingly simple oversight, and what can we
do to help mitigate this problem?
To answer these questions, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of this attack
surface. Specifically, we studied more than 98 generic system services (by Google)
and 72 vendor-specific services (by Samsung) in 6 Android versions, and identified
137 vulnerabilities (unique crashes de-duplicated across versions) on this surface. We
analyzed 115 of them in Android source codes and found that sanity checks are
most extensive around client-side public APIs, and quickly become sporadic/careless
after this defense line. Specifically, RPC parameters that are not exposed via public
APIs are frequently left unchecked and the underlying (de-)serialization process of
these parameters is often unprotected. This suggests that there is a mis-conception
of where the security boundary is for Android system services — many seem to
assume the security/trust boundary to be at the client-side public APIs, and whatever
happens thereafter is free from obstruction since they already belong to the system
territory. This mis-conception is understandable since Android provides convenient
and automatic code generation tools (AIDL) that at one side relieve the developers
from writing their own IPC stack, but at the other side hide all the details about
RPC and Binder. Thus, we argue for the necessity of introducing automatic testing
and protection at the Binder surface, i.e., the actual security boundary.
All the vulnerabilities reported in this chapter are identified by BinderCracker,
a precautionary testing framework we developed for Binder-based RPCs. Binder-
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Cracker is a context-aware fuzzing framework that understands the input and output
structure of each RPC transaction as well as the inter-dependencies between them.
This is essential because many transactions require inputs of remote object handles
which are output of other transactions and cannot be recorded in the form of raw
bytes. Before fuzzing a transaction, BinderCracker will automatically replay all the
transactions it depends on and generate the correct context. BinderCracker does not
require source codes of the services under test and works for services in both the Java
and native layers. Thus, it is readily compatible with both Android system services
and vendor-specific services. BinderCracker achieves effective vulnerability discovery
— it identified 7x more vulnerabilities than simple black-box fuzzing within the same
amount of time. Furthermore, since BinderCracker understands the schema of each
low-level RPC transaction, we can easily configure it to test high-level abstraction
or protocol built on top of the Binder primitives, such as Intent communications or
app-specific protocols.
To help mitigate this emerging attack surface, we need to eliminate potential
vulnerabilities as early as possible in the development cycle. Specifically, we suggest
the use of various precautionary testing techniques (including BinderCracker) before
each product release. This can stop a large number of vulnerabilities from reaching
the end-users. In fact, many severe vulnerabilities [24–27, 87] could have been avoided
had BinderCracker been deployed. Notably, 60% of the vulnerabilities identified by
BinderCracker still remain unfixed by the time they are found. We summarize these
vulnerabilities and have already reported them to AOSP. Many of the vulnerabilities
we identified are found to be able to crash the entire Android Runtime, while others
can cause specific system services or system apps to fail. Some vulnerabilities have
further security implications, and may result in permission leakage, privileged code
execution, targeted or permanent Denial-of-Service (DoS).
In case vulnerabilities leak through precautionary testing into the deployment
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phase, we need runtime defenses on this attack surface. Here, we addressed the urgent
problem of attack attribution for IPC-based attacks, which have not received enough
attention from the security community. Due to the lack of OS-level support, it is
extremely difficult to identify the culprit app even for developers with adb access, let
alone for average users. This suggests that an attacker app can sabotage the system
or crash other apps without being accused of, or may even blame others. For example,
the attacker app can crash Android Runtime whenever the user opens a competitor
app, creating the illusion that the competitor app is buggy. Similar attacks are
not rare between businesses with stiff competition [103]. To address this issue, we
proposed an informative runtime diagnostic tool. It maintains the sender, schema,
content and parsing information for each ongoing transaction, in case a failure/attack
happens. Whenever a system service fails when processing an incoming transaction,
a detailed report with the transaction information will be generated and a visual
warning will be prompted to the user. The reporting process can also be triggered
by access to privileged APIs or abnormal permission request, to catch attacks that
do not warrant a program crash. This brings transparency into IPC communications
and constitutes an essential first step for other in-depth analysis or forensics.
This work makes the following contributions: we
• Provide a systematic analysis of the attack surface by conducting security and
root cause analysis on 100+ vulnerabilities. We summarized the common mis-
takes made by system developers and found the attack surface persists largely
due to a common confusion of where the actual trust boundary is;
• Design and implement, BinderCracker, a context-aware fuzzing framework for
Android IPCs that actively managed the dependencies between transactions.
BinderCracker is compatible with Android system services, vendor-specific ser-
vices and can be easily configured to fuzz high-level abstractions or protocols.
It identifies 7x more vulnerabilities than a simple black-box fuzzing approach;
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• Propose a system-level diagnostic tool which addresses the attack attribution
problem for IPC-based attacks. By tracking the origin, schema and content of
ongoing transactions, it brings transparency into Android IPCs and provides
an essential step towards in-depth runtime analysis and defense.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes related
work in the field of software testing and Android security. Section 2.3 introduces
Binder and AIDL in Android, and describes how Android uses these to build sys-
tem services. Section 2.4 examines the attack surface and focus on explaining what
mistakes have the developers made and why. Section 2.5 details the design and
implementation of our testing framework, BinderCracker. Section 2.6 gives a com-
prehensive discussion on how to mitigate this attack surface with a special focus on
the attack attribution problem. Section 2.7 discusses the insight, and other potential
use-cases of BinderCracker, and finally, the chapter concludes with Section 2.8.
2.2 Related Work
Discussed below is related work in the field of software testing and Android secu-
rity.
Software Testing In the software community, robustness testing falls into two
categories: functional and exceptional testing. Functional testing focuses on verifi-
cation of the functionality of software using expected input, while exceptional test-
ing tries to apply unexpected and faulty inputs to crash the system. Numerous
efforts have been made in the software testing community to test the robustness of
Android [4, 5, 51, 65, 73, 112]. Most of them focus on the functional testing of GUI
elements [4, 5, 51, 65]. Some conducted exceptional testing on the evolving public
APIs [73]. In this work, we highlight the deficiency of testing public APIs only and
conduct exceptional testing on lower-level Binder-based RPC interfaces.
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Android Security Android has received significant attention from the research
community as an open source operating system [17, 34, 35, 48, 69, 90, 94, 99]. Existing
Android security studies largely focus on the imperfection of high-level permission
model [37, 39, 80], and the resulting issues, such as information leakage [34], privilege
escalation [17, 90] and collusion [69]. We will highlight the insufficient protection of
Android’s lower-level Binder-based RPC mechanism and how it affects the robustness
of system services.
There also exist a few studies focusing on the IPC mechanism of Android [20,
32, 54, 66, 91]. However, they largely focus on one specific instance of Android IPC
— Intent. Since the senders and recipients of Intents are both apps, manipulat-
ing Intents will not serve the purpose of exposing vulnerabilities in system services.
Some researchers also made recommendations for hardening Android IPCs [54, 66]
and pointed out that the key problem in Intent communication is the lack of for-
mal schema. We demonstrate that even for mechanisms enforcing a formal schema,
such as AIDL, robustness remains as a critical issue. There have also been some
parallel attempts on fuzzing the Binder interface in industry [41, 47]. However, they
focused on the technical details of implementing Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits on
this interface and only tested simple fuzzing techniques. Our work focuses instead
on understanding of the origin of the Binder attack surface and proposes practical
defenses. We summarize the common mistakes made by system developers by study-
ing 100+ real vulnerabilities and address the urgent problem of attack attribution for
IPC-based attacks. Moreover, our context-aware fuzzing framework, BinderCracker,
is sophisticated and works much more effectively than simple black-box fuzzing.
2.3 Android IPC and Binder
Android executes apps and system services as different processes and enforces iso-
lation between them. To enable different processes to exchange information with each
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other, Android provides, Binder, a secure and extensible IPC mechanism. Described
below are the basic concepts in the Binder framework and an explanation of how a
typical system service is built using these basic primitives.
2.3.1 Binder
In Android, Binder provides a message-based communication channel between
two processes. It consists of (i) a kernel-level driver that achieves communication
across process boundaries, (ii) a Binder library that uses ioctl syscall to talk with
the kernel-level driver, and (iii) upper-level abstracts that utilize the Binder library.
Conceptually, Binder takes a classical client–server architecture. A client can send
a transaction to the remote server via the Binder framework and then retrieves its
response. The parameters of the transaction are marshalled into a Parcel object
which is a serializable data container. The Parcel object is sent through the Binder
driver and then gets delivered to the server. The server de-serializes the parameters of
the Parcel object, processes the transaction, and returns a response in a similar way,
back to the client. This allows a client to achieve Remote Procedure Call (RPC) and
invoke methods on remote servers as if they were local. This Binder-based RPC is
one of the most frequent forms of IPC in Android, and underpins the implementation
of most system services.
2.3.2 Android Interface Description Language (AIDL)
Many RPC systems use IDL (Interface Description Language) to define and re-
strict the format of a remote invocation [66], and so does Android. The AIDL (An-
droid Interface Description Language) file allows the developer to define the RPC
interface both the client and the server agree upon [7]. Android can automatically
generate Stub and Proxy classes from an AIDL file and relieve the developers from








Figure 2.1: An example AIDL file which defines the interface of a service that imple-
ments a queue.
Figure 2.2: How does an app communicate with a system service using Binder-based RPC
(using Wi-Fi service as an example)? The red shaded region represents the codes that need
to be provided/implemented by the service developer.
auto-generated Stub and Proxy classes will ensure that the declared list of parame-
ters will be properly serialized, sent, received, and de-serialized. The developer only
needs to provide a .aidl file and implement the corresponding interface. In other
words, the AIDL file serves as an explicit contract between client and server. This
enforcement makes the Binder framework extensible, usable, and robust. Fig. 2.1
shows an example AIDL file that defines the interface of a service that implements a
queue.
2.3.3 System Service
We describe next how the low-level concepts in the Binder framework are struc-
tured to deliver a system service, using Wi-Fi service as an example. To implement
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the Wi-Fi service, system developers only need to define its interfaces as an AIDL de-
scription, and then implement the corresponding server-side logic (WifiService) and
client-side wrapper (WifiManager) (see Fig. 2.2). The serialization, transmission, and
de-serialization of the interface parameters are handled by the codes automatically
generated from the AIDL file. Specifically, when the client invokes some RPC method
in the client-side wrapper WifiManager, the Proxy class IWifiManager.Stub.Proxy
will marshall the input parameters in a Parcel object and send it across the pro-
cess boundary via the Binder driver. The Binder library at the server-side will
then unmarshall the parameters and invoke the onTransact function in the Stub
class IWifiManager.Stub. This eventually invokes the service logic programmed in
WifiService. Fig. 2.2 provides a clear illustration of the entire process.
2.4 Binder: The Attack Surface
The Binder driver serves as the boundary between two communicating parties
and separates them as client and server. Existing attacks on this interface typically
involve direct injection of a crafted transaction via the Binder interface. In theory,
at which layer is a transaction injected at the client-side should not affect the security
of the Android system — the server-side should always be robust on its own. This is
probably a best engineering practice for any system that adopts a client–server model.
However, as we will show later, this guideline is found to be frequently overlooked in
the implementation of Android system services. Here, we review 100+ vulnerabilities
found in six major Android versions and try to summarize the mistakes made by
the system developers that turn the Binder interface into a tempting attack surface,
and why system developers keep making these seemingly simple mistakes. All of the
vulnerabilities discussed in this section are discovered by BinderCracker, the first
context-aware fuzzing framework for Android IPCs. We will detail the design of
BinderCracker in the next section.
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Figure 2.3: A typical attack scenario. By injecting faulty transactions via the Binder
driver, an attacker can bypass the sanity check on public API and AIDL enforcement, and
directly challenge the server-side.
2.4.1 Attack Model
We assume the adversary is a malicious app developer trying to sabotage the
robustness or the integrity of Android system services. A system service can be
generic, existing in Android framework base, or vendor-specific, introduced by device
manufacturers. The attacker launch attacks by directly injecting crafted transactions
into the Binder interface. The consequences can range from Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack to privileged code execution, depending on the payload and the target of the
malicious transaction. We assume the attacker has no root permission and cannot
break the security of OS kernel. Fig. 2.3 illustrates a typical attack scenario.
2.4.2 Overview of Vulnerabilities
We identified 137 vulnerabilities on the Binder attack surface by testing 6 major
versions of Android: 4.1 (JellyBean), 4.2 (JellyBean), 4.4 (KitKat), 5.0 (Lollipop),
5.1 (Lollipop) and 6.0 (Marshmallow). Note that the number of discovered vulner-
abilities have already been de-duplicated across versions. Specifically, we examined
more than 98 generic system services (by Google) and 72 vendor-specific services (by
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Version API Market Device Build #
4.1.1 16 9.0% Galaxy Note 2 JRO03C
4.2.2 17 12.2% Galaxy S4 JDQ39
4.4.2 19 36.1% Galaxy S4 KOT49H
5.0.1 21 16.9% Nexus 5 LRX22C
5.1.0 22 15.7% Nexus 5 LMY47I
6.0.0 23 0.7% Nexus 5 MRA58K
Figure 2.4: List of Android ROMs we tested using BinderCracker.
Samsung), which covers more than 2400 low-level RPC methods. The majority of
the vulnerabilities are in Android framework while 15 of them are in vendor-specific
(Samsung) services. All our experiments are conducted by running BinderCracker on
official firmwares from major device manufacturers (see Fig. 2.4). An official firmware
went through extensive testing by the vendors and is believed to be ready for a public
release. Each firmware is tested in the initial state, right after it is installed. We
didn’t install any third-party app or change any configuration except for turning on
the adb debugging option, ruling out the influence of external factors.
An RPC method is found to be vulnerable if testing it resulted in a fatal exception,
crashing part of, or the entire Android Runtime. Each unique crash (stack traces)
under an RPC interface is further referred to as an individual vulnerability. For each
vulnerability reported here, we followed the process of: 1) identify it on an official
ROM, 2) manually confirm that it can be reproduced, and 3) inspect the source codes
for a root cause analysis. For vendor-specific vulnerabilities of which source codes are
not available, such as many of the customized system services provided by Samsung,
we only record the stack trace. Fig. 2.5 list the number of vulnerabilities grouped by
the exception types in the crash traces. The security implications of the identified
vulnerabilities will be further reviewed in Section 2.6.
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Figure 2.5: Vulnerabilities grouped by types of exception.
2.4.3 Root Cause Analysis
The direct causes of crashes are uncaught exceptions such as NullPointerException
or SEGV MAPPER, but the fundamental cause behind them is deeper. For each crashed
system service of which source codes are available, we looked into the source codes
and analyzed the root causes of the vulnerabilities. We noticed that sanity checks
are most extensive around client-side public APIs, but are sporadic/careless after this
line. This suggests that many system developers only considered the exploitation of
public APIs, thus directly injecting faulty transactions to the Binder driver creates
many scenarios that are believed to be ‘unlikely’ or ‘impossible’ in their mindset.
Here, we highlight some of the new attack vectors enabled by attacking the Binder
interface which contribute to most of the vulnerabilities we identified.
First, an attacker can manipulate RPC parameters that are not directly ex-
posed via public APIs. For example, IAudioFlinger provides an RPC method
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REGISTER CLIENT. This method is only implicitly called in the Android middleware
and is never exposed via public interfaces. Therefore, the developers of this system
service may not expect an arbitrary input from this RPC method and didn’t perform
a proper check of the input parameters. In our test, sending a list of null parameters
via the Binder driver can easily crash this service. This suggests that developers
should not overlook RPC interfaces that are private or hidden.
Second, an attacker can bypass sanity checks around the public API, no matter
how comprehensive they are. For example, the IBluetooth service provides a method
called registerAppConfiguration. All of the parameters of this RPC method are
directly exposed via a public API and there are multiple layers of sanity check around
this interface. Therefore, if there is an erroneous input from the public API, the client
will throw an exception and crash without even sending the transaction to the server
side. However, using our approach, an attack transaction is directly injected to the
Binder driver without even going through these client-side checks. This suggests that
the server should always double-check input parameters on its own.
Third, an attacker can exploit the serialization process of certain data types and
create inputs that are hazardous at the server side. For example, RemoteView is a
Parcelable object that represents a group of hierarchical views. It contains a loophole
in its de-serialization module which can cause a StackOverflow exception. As shown
in Fig. 2.6, a bad recursion will occur if the input Parcel object follows a certain
pattern. By directly manipulating the serialized bytes of the Parcel sent via the
Binder driver, this loophole can be triggered and crash the server. This suggests
that RPC methods with serializable inputs require special attention and sanity check
is also essential in the de-serializaiton process.
These common mistakes made by system developers indicate there is a miscon-
ception of where the security boundary is for Android system services — many may
assume the security/trust boundary is at the client-side public APIs, and whatever
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android.widget.RemoteViews
private RemoteViews(Parcel parcel , BitmapCache bitmapCache) {
int mode = parcel.readInt ();
...
if (mode == MODE_NORMAL) {
...
} else {
// recursively calls itself
mL = new RemoteViews(parcel , mBitmapCache);
// recursively calls itself





Figure 2.6: The constructor of the RemoteView class contains a loophole which can cause a
StackOverflow exception. Specifically, a bad recursion will occur if the input Parcel object
follows a specific pattern.
happens thereafter is free from obstruction since it is already in the system zone. This
mis-conception is understandable since Android provides the convenient abstraction
of AIDL and automatically generate codes that serialize, send, receive, de-serialize
RPC parameters. This at one side relieves the developers from implementing their
own IPC stack, but at the other side hide all the details about RPC and Binder. In
other words, even though Android system services depend on IPC extensively, the
developers are likely to be agnostic of that. Therefore, we advocate the importance
of introducing automatic testing and protection at the Binder surface — the actual
security boundary.
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2.5 Effective Vulnerability Discovery
In this section, we explain how to conduct effective vulnerability discovery through
the Binder interface. A naive approach is to issue transactions containing random
bytes, also known as black-box fuzzing. In our experiment, we found that when
using black-box fuzzing, almost all of the vulnerabilities are found within the first
few fuzzing transactions, and a longer fuzzing time did not lead to the discovery of
new bugs. The deficiency of black-box fuzzing is largely due to the extremely large
and complex fuzzing space of this attack surface, and drives us to develope more
sophisticated fuzzing techniques.
2.5.1 Unique Challenges
There are some unique challenges in fuzzing the Binder surface. First, a Binder
transaction may contain non-primitive data types which result in complicated and
hierarchical input schema. This affects 48% of all Binder-based RPCs and makes
it difficult to fuzz according to parameter types. Moreover, the list of parameters
included in a transaction is often dynamic instead of static. For example, when a
transaction takes a Bundle object as input, what this object contains highly depends
on the runtime status, and cannot be simply captured by a static interface description.
All of these make it difficult to generate schemas of Binder-based transactions in an
effective and reliable way.
Second, inter-dependencies often exist across Binder transactions. We found that
37% user-level RPC invocations require an input parameter that is the output of
previous transactions. Note that, these input parameters are remote handlers that
cannot be recorded in the form of raw bytes and can only be generated by executing
the same transactions. This process is extremely crucial if we want to fuzz dynamically
generated system services. While we can directly retrieve the handler of a statically
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cached system service and start to fuzz it, the handler of dynamically generated
system services can only be retrieved by replaying the sequence of transactions it
depends on.
Besides these two challenges, our design options are also restricted by the (un)availability
of the source codes for the system services under test. For example, in a typical Sam-
sung Galaxy device, there are more than 70 vendor-specific system services, the source
codes of which are clearly unavailable. Even for system services that are included in
the core Android framework, their source codes are typically proprietary when re-
lated to crypto or interactions with OEM hardwares. The scenario becomes more
exaggerated if considering services exported by system or user-level apps.
2.5.2 BinderCraker: Design Overview
We present an overview of the design of BinderCracker. Our design addresses the
above challenges by adopting a context-aware, replay-based approach that actively
manages the dependencies across transactions. Specifically, BinderCracker includes
a recording component, implemented as an Android extension (custom ROM), and a
fuzzing component, implemented as a user-level app. The recording component col-
lects detailed information of different Binder transactions and the fuzzing component
tries to replay and mutate each recorded transaction for fuzzing purposes.
The recording component builds and records the schema (parameter types and
structure) of each transaction during runtime by instrumenting the (de)-serialization
process of the Binder transaction. This is different from the approach that parses
RPC interface (AIDL) files and does not require access to the source codes. Specifi-
cally, it monitors and records how each parameter is unmarshalled from the Parcel
object. This instrumentation works recursively with the (de)-serialization functions,
and thus can understand and record complicated, hierarchical schemas and non-
primitive types. In additional to recording the transaction schema, BinderCracker au-
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Figure 2.7: When fuzzing a transaction, we need to replay the supporting transactions
according to their relative order in the dependency graph. This way, all the remote objects
this transaction requires will be reconstructed during runtime.
tomatically matches the inputs and outputs of adjacent transactions and constructs a
dependency graph among them. This dependency graph captures the sequence (tree)
of transactions required to generate the inputs of a target transaction (see Fig. 2.7).
This allows BinderCracker to automatically manage the dependencies between trans-
actions and reconstruct the dynamic context each transaction requires. For example,
certain system services, such as IGraphicBufferProducer, are dynamically initial-
ized instead of statically cached in the system server. Fuzzing it typically requires
manually writing a code section that first generates this service and then using re-
flections on private APIs to retrieve the handler, which is tedious and not scalable.
BinderCracker greatly simplifies this process since all the transactions that generate
this service will be replayed automatically before the actual fuzzing process.
After recording the seed transactions and their dependencies, we need to utilize
them to fuzz a system service. The fuzzing component of BinderCracker has a replay
engine built-in and is implemented as a user-level app. Basically, it is manipulating
(either directly or indirectly) a binder transaction data struct sent to the Binder
driver. This data struct contains three important pieces of information we need to
modify to send a fuzzing transaction and has the format as shown in Fig. 2.8. The
target.handle field specifies the service this transaction is sent to. The code field
represents a specific RPC method we want to fuzz. The data struct contains the
serialized bytes of the list of parameters for the RPC method, which is inherently a
Parcel object. Parcel is a container class that provides a convenient set of serial-




















} data; // (3).transactional data
};
Figure 2.8: The data struct sent through the Binder diver via the ioctl libc call. This
struct contains three important pieces of information we need to modify to send a fuzzing
transaction.
server work directly with this Parcel object to send and receive the input parame-
ters. Later in this section, we will elaborate on how to modify the handle and code
variables to redirect the transaction to a specific RPC method of a specified service,
and how to fuzz the Parcel object to facilitate testing with different policies.
2.5.3 Transaction Redirection
There is a one-to-one mapping from the handle variable in the binder transaction data
object to system service. This mapping is created during runtime and maintained by
the Binder driver. Since the client has no control over the Binder driver, it cannot
get this mapping directly. For system services that are statically cached, we can get
them indirectly by querying a static service manager which has a fixed handle of
0. This service manager is a centralized controller for service registry and will be
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started before any other services. By sending a service interface descriptor (such as
android.os.IWindowManager) to the service manager, it will return an IBinder ob-
ject which contains the handle for the specified service. For system services that are
dynamically allocated, we can retrieve them by recursively replaying the supporting
transactions that generate these services (see Fig. 2.7).
After getting the handle of a system service, we need to specify the code vari-
able in the binder transaction data object. Each code represents a different RPC
method defined in the AIDL file. This mapping can be found in the Stub files which
are automatically generated from the AIDL file. The code variable typically ranges
from 1 to the total number of methods declared in the AIDL file. For native system
services that are not implemented in Java, this mapping is directly coded in either
the source files or the header files. Therefore, we scan both the AIDL files and the
native source codes of Android to construct the mapping between transaction codes
and RPC methods.
2.5.4 Transaction Fuzzing
After being able to redirect a Binder transaction to a chosen RPC method of
a chosen system service, the next step is to manipulate the transaction data and
create faulty transactions that are unlikely to occur in normal circumstances. Here,
BinderCracker utilize our context-aware replay engine to generate semi-valid fuzzing
transactions. A transaction is said to be semi-valid if all of the parameters it contains
are valid except for one. Semi-valid transactions can dive deeper into the program
structure without being early rejected, thus is able to reveal more in-depth vulnera-
bilities.
In summary, BinderCracker maintains both the type hierarchy and dependency
graph when recording a seed transaction. These information capture the semantic
and context of each transaction and help BinderCracker generate semi-valid fuzzing
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Figure 2.9: How does BinderCracker generate semi-valid fuzzing transactions from seed
transactions.
Figure 2.10: The internal type structure of a non-primitive data type, Intent, generated
by recording the de-serialization process of each non-primitive type. Note that this type
structure is dynamic — it depends on what has been put into this Intent during runtime.
transactions. Specifically, it follows the process illustrated in Fig. 2.9. For each seed
transaction we want to fuzz, we first parse the raw bytes of the transaction and un-
marshall non-primitive data types into an array of primitive types (step 1). This
utilizes the type hierarchy recorded with the seed transaction. Then, we check the
dependency of the transaction (step 2) and retrieve all the supporting transactions
(steps 3, 4). This step utilizes the dependency graph recorded with the seed transac-
tion. After that, we need to replay the supporting transactions (step 5) to generate
and cache the remote IBinder object handles (steps 6, 7). Finally, the fuzzer can
start to generate semi-valid fuzzing transactions by mutating each parameter in the
seed transaction according to their data types (steps 8, 9). For example, for numerical
types such as Integer, we may add or substrate a small delta from the current value
or change it to Integer.MAX, 0 or Integer.MIN; for literal types such as String, we
may randomly mutate the bytes contained in the String, append new content at start
or end, or insert special characters at certain locations.
After sending a faulty transaction to a remote service, there are a few possible
responses from the server-side. First, the server detects the input is invalid and rejects
the transaction, writing an IllegalArgumentException message back to the client.
29
Second, the server accepts the argument and starts the transaction, but encounters
unexpected states or behaviors and catches some type of RuntimeException. Third,
the server doesn’t catch some bizarre scenarios, causes a Fatal Exception and crashes
itself. In this work, we focus on the last type of responses, as it is most critical and
has disastrous consequences.
2.5.5 Experimental Results
We collected more than one million valid seed transactions by running 30 popular
apps in two latest Android versions (Android 5.1 and Android 6.0). For each RPC
interface, we sampled the transactions and selected those with unique transaction
schema/structures. Based on this seed dataset, we performed fuzzing test on more
than 445 RPC methods of 78 system services. In total, we identified 89 vulnerabilities
in Android 5.1 and Android 6.0 which is 7x more than simple fuzzing with the same
time spent. Compared to the vulnerabilities identified using simple black-box fuzzing,
the vulnerabilities exposed by context-aware fuzzing are more interesting and have
severer security implications — we start to identify buffer overflow, serialization bugs
in deeper layers of the code, instead of just simple crashes or parsing errors (see
Section 2.6 for details).
Moreover, since the approach BinderCracker adopts is generic, we can easily con-
figure it to fuzz higher-level abstractions or protocols. For example, Intent is a
high-level abstraction built on top of the Binder RPCs. It is used as a user-level
communication primitive to launch apps, services or trigger broadcast receivers. With
some simple configuration, we can turn BinderCracker into an Intent fuzzer. Specif-
ically, we configure BinderCracker to only fuzz three RPC interfaces that the Intent
communication mechanism is built upon, and only mutate the Intent parameter in
these RPC calls. This makes BinderCracker a useful Intent fuzzer that automatically
tracks and utilizes the internal type hierarchy of Intent extras (Bundle). Fig. 2.10
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illustrates the input structure of an example Intent we fuzz. In total, BinderCracker
identified more than 20 vulnerabilities in the Intent communication, many of which
exist in the de-serialization process of Intent.
2.6 Defenses
New vulnerabilities are still emerging on the Binder attack surface whenever there
is a major upgrade of the Android code base. This is because, considering the code
size of Android, it is almost impossible to prevent the developers from writing buggy
codes. We discussed how to conduct effective precautionary testing to help expose
vulnerabilities before releasing the new ROM, and also explained why it is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to conduct runtime defense in existing Android systems. The
major obstacle in developing runtime defenses is the lack of transparency/auditing
on IPC transactions. When a system service fails, no one knows why it crashed and
who caused its crash without proper OS-level support. Thus, a system-level IPC di-
agnosis tool is essential for any in-depth runtime analysis, such as attack attribution
and cross-device analytics.
2.6.1 Precautionary Testing
Before releasing a new ROM, developers can conduct precautionary testing. The
defense can be done early, in the development phase of each system service, or later,
after the entire ROM gets built.
Android has already adopted a static code analysis tool, lint, to check poten-
tial bugs and optimizations for correctness, security, performance, usability, acces-
sibility and internationalization [52]. Specifically, lint provides a feature that sup-
ports inspection with annotations. This allows the developer to add metadata tags
to variables, parameters and return values. For example, the developer can mark
an input parameter as @NonNull, indicating that it cannot be Null, or mark it as
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@IntRange(from=0,to=255), enforcing that it can only be within a given range.
Then, lint automatically analyzes the source codes and prompts potential violations.
This can be extended to support inspections of RPC interfaces, allowing developers
to explicitly declare the constraints for each RPC input parameter. This way, many
potential bugs can be eliminated during the development phase. This defense is prac-
tical and comprehensive but requires system developers to specify the metadata tags
for each RPC interface.
We can also conduct precautionary testing during runtime after the ROM has
been built. Our system, BinderCracker, is effective in identifying vulnerabilities and
can be used as an automatic testing tool. By fuzzing various system services with
different policies, a large number of vulnerabilities can be eliminated before reach-
ing the end-users. Actually, many severe vulnerabilities [24–27, 87] could have been
avoided if a tool like BinderCracker had been deployed. Note that the effectiveness
of BinderCracker depends on the quality and coverage of the seed transactions. Be-
sides collecting execution traces of a large number of apps, another potential way of
generating a comprehensive seed dataset is to incorporate the functional unit tests of
each system service.
2.6.2 Security Implications
Most of the vulnerabilities BinderCracker discovered (more than 90%) can be used
to launch a Denial-Of-Service (DoS) attack. Some of them are found to be able to
crash the entire Android Runtime, while others can cause specific system services or
system apps to fail. Fig. 2.11 shows the distribution of the affected services (apps).
When launching a DoS attack, the attacker can trigger a crash either consistently
or only under certain conditions, for example, when a competitor’s app is running.
This can create the impression that the competitor’s app is buggy and unusable.


































































Figure 2.11: Many of the vulnerabilities we identified are found to be able to crash the
entire Android Runtime (system server), while others can cause specific system services
(mediaserver) or system apps (nfc, contacts, etc) to fail.
that can cause targeted crash of almost any system/user-level apps, without crashing
the entire system. Specifically, an attacker can craft an Intent that contains a mal-
formated Bundle object and send to the target app. This will cause a crash during
the de-serialization process of the Intent object before the target app can conduct
any sanity check. Moreover, it can be very challenging to identify the attacker app
under these scenarios because the OS only knows which service/app is broken, but
cannot tell who crashed it. We will discuss more about the attack attribution process
in later sections.
We also discovered a few vulnerabilities that can cause other serious security
problems. We found that in several RPC methods, the server-side fails to check
potential Integer overflows. This may lead to disastrous consequences when exploited
by an experienced attacker. For example, in IGraphicBufferProducer an Integer
overflow exists such that when a new NativeHandle is created, the server will malloc
smaller memory than it actually requested (see Fig. 2.12). Subsequent writes to
this data struct will corrupt the heap on the server-side. This vulnerability has been
demonstrated to be able to achieve privileged code execution, and insert any arbitrary
code into system server [25]. We also found a vulnerability in IContentService
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native_handle_t* native_handle_create(int numFds , int numInts)
{
// numFds & numInts are not checked!







Figure 2.12: The constructor of the native handle has an Integer Overflow vulnerability
that can cause a heap corruption on the server-side. This can lead to privileged code
execution in system server.
that can lead to an infinite bootloop, which can only be resolved by factory recovery
or flashing a new ROM. This is also classified as High Risk according to the official
specification of Android severity levels [92].
Besides RPC methods that are not well implemented, we also discovered RPC
methods that are not properly protected by existing Permission models. In official
ROMs of Samsung Galaxy 4 (Android 4.2.2 and Android 4.4.2), an attacker can
reboot the device by directly sending a transaction to PackageManagerService via
the Binder driver without requiring the REBOOT permission. This is critical since
REBOOT is a sensitive permission only granted to system apps. The other service
is ICoverManager, a customized service from Samsung. An attacker can invoke a
certain RPC method of ICoverManager and block the entire screen with a pop-up
blank Activity. The blank Activity cannot be revoked using any virtual or physical
button and the only exit is restarting the device.
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2.6.3 Vulnerabilities: Fixed and Unfixed
We examined how many of the vulnerabilities discovered by BinderCracker remain
unfixed and are potentially zero-day when they are found. Our analysis is based on
the public changes of the source codes across different Android versions and revisions.
We skipped the 15 vulnerabilities in vendor-specific system services and 7 in generic
system services due to the unavailability of source codes. Note that not all generic
system services are open source, especially when it is related to decryption/encryption
or interactions with OEM hardware.
Of the 115 analyzed vulnerabilities in Android code bases, only 18 have been fixed
by adding additional sanity checks of input parameters. Another 12 vulnerabilities
‘disappeared’ during several major Android version upgrades either because 1) the
corresponding source codes (or API) have been deleted; or 2) new updates in other
parts of the source codes accidentally bypass the vulnerable source codes. For exam-
ple, some crashes are caused by a recursive call in the RemoteView class (see Fig. 2.6).
Similar crashes disappeared after Android 5.0. We looked into the source codes and
found this is not because the bug has been fixed, but because in new versions of
Android a faulty transaction will create an additional Exception before it reaches
the vulnerable codes. The additional Exception is properly caught and accidentally
avoids the fatal crash caused by the real vulnerability. We do not consider this as a
‘fix’ since an attacker can still recreate the crash by manually crafting a transaction
which bypasses the new code updates. Fig. 2.13 illustrates the proportion of vul-
nerabilities that are fixed, disappeared and unfixed. We have already submitted all
unfixed vulnerabilities to AOSP.
2.6.4 Runtime Diagnostics and Defenses
It will be helpful if Android can provide some real-time defense against potential










Figure 2.13: Number of the vulnerabilities that are fixed, disappeared and unfixed.
focus on specific defenses on the Binder layer, excluding generic defenses such as Ad-
dress Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), SELinux, etc. They have been discussed
extensively eslewhere [59, 93, 96] and are not specific to our scenario. Basically, there
are two potential defenses one can provide on the Binder surface during runtime: (i)
intrusion detection/prevention, identifying and rejecting transactions that are mali-
cious, and (ii) intrusion diagnostics, making an attack visible after the transaction
has already caused some damage. Unfortunately, both approaches are not applicable
in existing Android systems. Next, we explain why the first approach is inherently
challenging and then describe our efforts to enable the latter.
To provide runtime intrusion prevention, one needs to perform some type of ab-
normality detection on incoming transactions. This works by examining the input pa-
rameters of valid/invalid RPC invocations and characterizing the rules or boundaries.
However, in our case, it is not practical for the following reasons. First, Binder trans-
actions occur at a very high frequency but a mobile device has only limited energy
and computation power. Second, parameters in Binder transactions are very diverse,
codependent, and evolving dynamically during runtime, and hence clear boundaries
or rules may not exist. Third, end-users are not likely to accept even the smallest
false-positive rate. One can, of course, build a very conservative blacklist-based sys-
tem and hard-coding rules of each potential vulnerability in the database. However,
36
Figure 2.14: A detailed crash report which includes the system service under attack (0),
transaction sender (1 and 2), schema (3), position of the parsing cursor (4) and raw content
(5).
this seems unnecessary, especially when Android nowadays supports directly pushing
security updates (patches) to devices of end-users.
An alternative solution is to diagnose, instead of prevent problems. It would be
helpful if we can provide more visibility on how malicious transactions actually under-
mine a device. Even though this cannot stop the single device from being attacked,
we can still utilize the collected statistics to develop in-time security patches, benefit-
ing the vast majority of end-users. However, it is impossible to conduct informative
diagnostic on the Binder layer even for developers with adb access. This is due to a
lack of transparency/auditing on IPC transactions. Essentially, when a system ser-
vice fails, no one knows why it crashed and who crashed it without proper OS-level
support. This, also known as attack attribution, has not yet received enough attention
from the research community. To fill this gap, we propose a system-layer diagnostic
tool and demonstrate its use for more in-depth analyses.
The diagnostic tool is designed to provide three important functionalities: 1) when
a service fails when processing an incoming transaction, the sender of the transaction
will be recorded and the user will be warned with a visual prompt; 2) detailed in-
formation of the failed transaction, including the content, schema and parsing status
will be dumped into a report for future forensics; 3) a signature of the transaction
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Figure 2.15: User receives a visual prompt in case of transaction failure and can choose to
block it to counter continuous DoS attack.
will be generated and the user can review it and choose to block future occurrences
of the same transaction. These, together, capture a snapshot of the IPC stack in case
of a potential attack. This snapshot can be triggered by a crash, for DoS attacks, or
by access to sensitive/privileged APIs, for privilege escalation attacks.
The diagnostic tool can be implemented in a similar way as the recording compo-
nent of BinderCracker, by instrumenting the Binder framework and the Parcel class.
We can further retrieve the sender of each transaction by calling Binder.getCallingUid()
in the victim system service, and get the package name of the sender by querying the
PackageManagerService with the retrieved uid. The same flow is also used to sup-
port permission checks in Android system services. The schema of each transaction is
constructed and maintained during runtime by tracking the de-serialization process of
the Parcel. Whenever an Exception is thrown and not caught by any of the Exception
handling blocks, the transaction information maintained will be dumped as a separate
report (see Fig. 2.14). The parsing information will be appended, indicating which
parameters the service is parsing (have just parsed) when the failure/attack happens.
The signature of the transaction will be recorded and the user will be prompted with a
Notification (see Fig. 2.15). End-users can choose to block transactions with the same
signature in the future to mitigate continuous DoS attacks. This marks an essential
step towards more sophisticated runtime analysis, such cross-device analytics.
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2.7 Discussion
We have assessed a risky attack surface comprehensively which has long been
overlooked by the system developers of Android. As our experimental results demon-
strated, new vulnerabilities are still emerging on this attack surface and Binder-
Cracker can help eliminate potential vulnerabilities in future releases of Android.
The lessons learned can transcend to other platforms facing similar issues, such as
vehicular systems (CAN buses and ECUs), wearable devices, etc. We highlight that,
although many systems adopt a client–server model in the design of their internal
system components, they rarely follow the security standards of a real client–server
model as in a networked environment. In many scenarios, a component may fall into
the wrong hands and create serious security threats.
Our context-aware fuzzing is generic and not limited to system services. In fact,
it can also be applied to services exported by user-level apps. For example, Facebook
alone exports more than 30 services to other apps which forms a large attack surface.
By performing fuzzing on this interface, more app-level vulnerabilities are expected
to be unearthed. However, due to the unavailability of source codes, it is difficult
to analyze the root causes and security implications of the identified vulnerabilities.
Note that, although lack of source codes won’t affect the discovery of vulnerabilities,
it does make it more difficult to understand their implications.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we conducted an in-depth analysis on an emerging attack surface
in Android. We summarized the common mistakes made by system developers that
produces this attack surface and highlight the importance of testing and protection
on the Binder interface, the actual trust boundary. We designed and implemented
BinderCracker, a precautionary testing framework that achieves automatic vulnera-
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bility discovery. It supports context-aware fuzzing and performs 7x more effectively
than a simple black-box fuzzing approach. We also addressed the urgent problem
of attack attribution for IPC-based attacks, proposing OS-level runtime diagnostics
support. These mechanisms are useful, practical and can be easily integrated into the
development/deployment cycle of Android.
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CHAPTER III
Reducing Unregulated Aggregation of App Usage
Behaviors
3.1 Introduction
Mobile users run apps for various purposes, and exhibit very different or even
unrelated behaviors in running different apps. For example, a user may expose his
chatting history to WhatsApp, mobility traces to Maps, and political interests to
CNN. Information about a single user, therefore, is scattered across different apps
and each app acquires only a partial view of the user. Ideally, these views should
remain as ‘isolated islands of information’ confined within each of the different apps.
In practice, however, once the users’ behavioral information is at the hands of the
apps, it may be shared or leaked in an arbitrary way without the users’ control or
consent. This makes it possible for a curious adversary to aggregate usage behaviors
of the same user across multiple apps without his knowledge and consent, which we
refer to as unregulated aggregation of app-usage behaviors.
In the current mobile ecosystem, many parties are interested in conducting un-
regulated aggregation, including:
• Advertising Agencies embed ad libraries in different apps, establishing an ex-
plicit channel of cross-app usage aggregation. For example, Grindr is a geosocial
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app geared towards gay users, and BabyBump is a social network for expecting
parents. Both apps include the same advertising library, MoPub, which can
aggregate their information and recommend related ads, such as on gay parent-
ing books. However, users may not want this type of unsolicited aggregation,
especially across sensitive aspects of their lives.
• Surveillance Agencies monitor all aspects of the population for various precau-
tionary purposes, some of which may cross the ‘red line’ of individuals’ pri-
vacy. It has been widely publicized that NSA and GCHQ are conducting public
surveillance by aggregating information leaked via mobile apps, including pop-
ular ones such as Angry Birds [8]. A recent study [108] shows that a similar
adversary is able to attribute up to 50% of the mobile traffic to the “monitored”
users, and extract detailed personal interests, such as political views and sexual
orientations.
• IT Companies in the mobile industry frequently acquire other app companies,
harvesting vast user base and data. Yahoo alone acquired more than 10 mobile
app companies in 2013, with Facebook and Google following closely behind [2].
These acquisitions allow an IT company to link and aggregate behaviors of
the same user from multiple apps without the user’s consent. Moreover, if the
acquiring company (such as Facebook) already knows the users’ real identities,
usage behaviors of all the apps it acquires become identifiable.
These scenarios of unregulated aggregation are realistic, financially motivated,
and are only becoming more prevalent in the foreseeable future. In spite of this grave
privacy threat, the process of unregulated aggregation is unobservable and works as
a black box — no one knows what information has actually been aggregated and
what really happens in the cloud. Users, therefore, are largely unaware of this threat
and have no opt-out options. Existing proposals disallow apps from collecting user
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behaviors and shift part of the app logic (e.g., personalization) to the mobile OS
or trusted cloud providers [29, 60]. This, albeit effective, is against the incentive of
app developers and requires construction of a new ecosystem. Therefore, there is
an urgent need for a practical solution that is compatible with the existing mobile
ecosystem.
In this chapter, we propose a new way of addressing the unregulated aggregation
problem by monitoring, characterizing and reducing the underlying linkability across
apps. Two apps are linkable if they can associate their usage behaviors of the same
user. This linkability is the prerequisite of conducting unregulated aggregation and
represents an upper-bound of the potential threat. Researchers studied linkability un-
der domain-specific scenarios, such as on movie reviews [79] and social networks [58].
In contrast, we focus on the linkability that is ubiquitous in the mobile ecosystem
and introduced by domain-independent factors, such as device IDs, account numbers,
location and inter-app communications. Specifically, we model mobile apps on the
same device as a Dynamic Linkability Graph (DLG) which monitors apps’ access to
OS-level identifying information and cross-app communication channels. DLG quan-
tifies the potential threat of unregulated aggregation and allows us to monitor the
linkability across apps during runtime.
We implemented DLG as an Android extension and observed how it evolved on 13
users during a period of 47 days. The results reveal an alarming view of the app-level
linkability in the wild. Two random apps (installed by the same user) are linkable
with a probability of 0.81. Specifically, 86% of the apps a user installed are directly
linkable to the Facebook app, namely, his real identity. In particular, we found
that apps frequently abuse OS-level information and inter-process communication
(IPC) channels in unexpected ways, establishing the linkability that is unrelated
to app functionalities. For example, we found that many of the apps requesting
account information collect all of the user’s accounts even when they only need one
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to function correctly. We also noticed that some advertising agencies, such as Admob
and Facebook, use IPCs to share user identifiers with other apps, completely bypassing
system permissions and controls. Furthermore, we identified cases when different apps
write and read the same persistent file in shared storage to exchange user identifiers.
The end-users should be promptly warned about these unexpected behaviors to reduce
unnecessary linkability.
Based on the above observations, we propose LinkDroid, a linkability-aware ex-
tension to Android which provides runtime monitoring and mediation of the linka-
bility across apps. LinkDroid introduces a new dimension to privacy protection on
smartphones. Instead of checking whether some app behavior poses direct privacy
threat, LinkDroid warns users about how it implicitly affects the linkability across
apps. Practicality is a main driver for the design of LinkDroid. It extends the widely-
deployed (both runtime and install-time) permission model on the mobile OS that
end-users are already familiar with. Specifically, LinkDroid provides the following
privacy-enhancing features:
• Install-Time Obfuscation: LinkDroid obfuscates device-specific identifiers
that have no influence on most app functionalities, such as IMEI, Android ID,
etc. We perform this during install-time to maintain the consistency of these
identifiers within each app.
• Runtime Linkability Monitoring: When an app tries to perform a certain
action that introduces additional linkability, users will receive a just-in-time
prompt and an intuitive risk indicator. Users can then exercise runtime access
control and choose any of the opt-out options provided by LinkDroid.
• Unlinkable Mode: The user can start an app in unlinkable mode. This will
create a new instance of the app which is unlinkable with other apps. All actions
that may establish a direct association with other apps will be denied by default.
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This way, users can enjoy finer-grained privacy protection, unlinking only a set
of app sessions.
We evaluated LinkDroid on the same set of 13 users as in our measurement and
found that LinkDroid reduces the cross-app linkability substantially with little loss
of app performance. The probability of two random apps being linkable is reduced
from 0.81 to 0.21, and the percentage of apps that are directly linkable to Facebook
drops from 86% to 18%. On average, a user only needs to handle 1.06 prompts per
day in the 47-day experiments and the performance overhead is marginal.
This work makes the following contributions:
1. Introduction of a novel perspective of defending against unregulated aggregation
by addressing the underlying linkability across apps (Section 3.2).
2. Proposal of the Dynamic Linkability Graph (DLG) which enables runtime mon-
itoring of cross-app linkability (Section 3.3).
3. Identification of real-world evidence of how apps abuse IPCs and OS-level in-
formation to establish linkability across apps (Section 3.4).
4. Addition of a new dimension to access control based on the runtime linkability,
and development of a practical countermeasure, LinkDroid, to defend against
unregulated aggregation (Section 3.5).
3.2 Privacy Threats: A New Perspective
In this section, we will first introduce our threat model of unregulated aggregation
and then propose a novel perspective of addressing it by monitoring, characterizing
and reducing the linkability across apps. We will also summarize the explicit/implicit
sources of linkability in the current mobile app ecosystem.
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3.2.1 Threat Model
In this work, we target unregulated aggregation across app-usage behaviors, i.e.,
when an adversary aggregates usage behaviors across multiple functionally-independent
apps without users’ knowledge or consent. In our threat model, an adversary can be
any party that collects information from multiple apps or controls multiple apps, such
as a widely-adopted advertising agency, an IT company in charge of multiple authen-
tic apps, or a set of malicious colluding apps. We assume the mobile operating system
and network operators are trustworthy and will not collude with the adversary.
3.2.2 Linkability: A New Perspective
There are many parties interested in conducting unregulated aggregation across
apps. In practice, however, this process is unobservable and works as a black box
— no one knows what information an adversary has collected and whether it has
been aggregated in the cloud. Existing studies propose to disable mobile apps from
collecting usage behaviors and shift part of the app logic to trusted cloud providers or
mobile OS [29, 60]. These solutions, albeit effective, require building a new ecosystem
and greatly restrict functionalities of the apps. Here, we address unregulated aggre-
gation from a very different angle by monitoring, characterizing and reducing the
underlying linkability across mobile apps. Two apps are linkable if they can associate
usage behaviors of the same user. This linkability is the prerequisite of conducting
unregulated aggregation, and represents an “upper-bound” of the potential threat.
In the current mobile app ecosystem, there are various sources of linkability that an
adversary can exploit. Researchers have studied linkability under several domain-
specific scenarios, such as movie reviews [79] and social networks [58]. Here, we focus
on the linkability that is ubiquitous and domain-independent. Specifically, we group
its contributing sources into the following two fundamental categories.
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Type 2013-3 2013-10 2014-8 2015-1
Android ID 80% 84% 87% 91%
IMEI 61% 64% 65% 68%
MAC 28% 42% 51% 55%
Account 24% 29% 32% 35%
Contacts 21% 26% 33% 37%
Table 3.1: Apps are increasingly interested in requesting persistent and consistent identi-
fying information during the past few years.
OS-Level Information The mobile OS provides apps ubiquitous access to various
system information, many of which can be used as consistent user identifiers across
apps. These identifiers can be device-specific, such as MAC address and IMEI, user-
specific, such as phone number or account number, or context-based, such as location
or IP clusters. We conducted a longitudinal measurement study from March 2013 to
January 2015, on the top 100 free Android apps in each category. We excluded the
apps that are rarely downloaded, and considered only those with more than 1 million
downloads. We found that apps are getting increasingly interested in requesting
persistent and consistent identifying information, as shown in Table 3.1. By January
2015, 96% of top free apps request both the Internet access and at least one persistent
identifying information. These identifying vectors, either explicit or implicit, allow
two apps to link their knowledge of the same user at a remote side without even
trying to bypass on-device isolation of the mobile OS.
Inter-Process Communications The mobile OS provides explicit Inter-Process
Communication (IPC) channels, allowing apps to communicate with each other and
perform certain tasks, such as export a location from Browser and open it with Maps.
Since there is no existing control on IPC, colluding apps can exchange identifying in-
formation of the user and establish linkability covertly, without the user’s knowledge.
They can even synchronize and agree on a randomly-generated sequence as a custom
user identifier, without accessing any system resource or permission. This problem
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gets more complex since apps can also conduct IPC implicitly by reading and writing
shared persistent storage (SD card and databases). As we will show in Section 3.4,
these exploitations are not hypothetical and have already been utilized by real-world
apps.
3.3 Dynamic Linkability Graph
The cornerstone of our work is the Dynamic Linkability Graph (DLG). It enables
us to monitor app-level linkability during runtime and quantify the linkability intro-
duced by different contributing sources. In what follows, we will elaborate on the
definition of DLG, the linkability sources it considers, and describe how it can be
implemented as an extension of Android.
3.3.1 Basic Concepts
We model linkability across different apps on the same device as an undirected
graph, which is called the Dynamic Linkability Graph (DLG). Nodes in DLG repre-
sent apps and edges represent linkability introduced by different contributing sources.
DLG monitors the linkability during runtime by tracking the apps’ access to various
OS-level information and IPC channels. An edge exists between two apps if they
accessed the same identifying information or engaged in an IPC. Fig. 3.1 presents an
illustrative example of DLG.
DLG presents a comprehensive view of the linkability across all installed apps.
An individual adversary, however, may only observe a subgraph of the DLG. For
example, an advertising agency only controls those apps (nodes) that incorporate
the same advertising library; an IT corporate only controls those apps (nodes) it has
already acquired. In the rest of the chapter, we focus on the generalized case (the
entire DLG) instead of considering each adversary individually (subgraphs of DLG).
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Figure 3.1: An illustrative example of DLG. Edges of different types represent linkability
introduced by different sources.
3.3.2 Definitions and Metrics
Linkable Two apps a and b are linkable if there is a path between them. In Fig. 3.1,
app A and F are linkable, app A and H are not linkable.
Gap is defined as the number of nodes (excluding the end nodes) on the shortest
path between two linkable apps a and b. It represents how many additional apps an
adversary needs to control in order to link information across a and b. For example,
in Fig. 3.1, gapA,D = 0, gapA,E = 1, gapA,G = 2.
Linking Ratio (LR) of an app is defined as the number of apps it is linkable to,
divided by the number of all installed apps. LR ranges from 0 to 1 and characterizes
to what extent an app is linkable to others. In DLG, LR equals to the size of the
Largest Connected Component (LCC) this app resides in, excluding itself, divided by




Linking Effort (LE) of an app is defined as the Linking Effort (LE) of an app as
the average gap between it and all the apps it is linkable to. LEa characterizes the
difficulty in establishing linkability with a. LEa = 0 means that to link information
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from app a and any random app it is linkable to, an adversary does not need additional







LR and LE describe two orthogonal views of the DLG. In general, LR represents
the quantity of links, describing the percentage of all installed apps that are linkable
to a certain app, whereas LE characterizes the quality of links, describing the average
amount of effort an adversary needs to make to link a certain app with other apps.
In Fig. 3.1, LRA = 6/8, LRH = 1/8; LEA =
0+0+0+1+1+2
7−1 = 4/6, LEH = 0.
GLR and GLE Both LR and LE are defined for a single app, and we also need two
similar definitions for the entire graph. So, we introduce Global Linking Ratio (GLR)
and Global Linking Effort (GLE). GLR represents the probability of two randomly
selected apps being linkable, while GLE represents the number of apps an adversary















In graph theory, GLE is also known as the Characteristic Path Length (CPL)
of a graph, which is widely used in Social Network Analysis (SNA) to characterize
whether the network is easily negotiable or not.
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3.3.3 Sources of Linkability
DLG maintains a dynamic view of app-level linkability by monitoring runtime be-
haviors of the apps. Specifically, it keeps track of apps’ access to device-specific iden-
tifiers (IMEI, Android ID, MAC), user-specific identifiers (Phone Number, Accounts,
Subscriber ID, ICC Serial Number), and context-based information (IP, Nearby APs,
Location). It also monitors explicit IPC channels (Intent, Service Binding) and im-
plicit IPC channel (Indirect RW, i.e., reading and writing the same file or database).
This is not an exhaustive list but covers most standard and widely-used aggregating
channels. Table 3.2 presents a list of all the contributing sources we consider and the
details of each source will be elaborated in Section 3.4.
The criterion of two apps being linkable differs depending on the linkability source.
For consistent identifiers that are obviously unique — Android ID, IMEI, Phone
Number, MAC, Subscriber ID, Account, ICC Serial Number — two apps are linkable
if they both accessed the same type of identifier. For pair-wise IPCs — intents,
service bindings, and indirect RW — the two communicating parties involved are
linkable. For implicit and fuzzy information, such as location, nearby APs, and
IP, there are well-known ways to establish linkability as well. User-specific location
clusters (Points of Interests, or PoIs) is already known to be able to uniquely identify a
user [42, 56, 114]. Therefore, an adversary can link different apps by checking whether
the location information they collected reveal the same PoIs. Here, the PoIs are
extracted using a lightweight algorithm as used in [13, 36]. We select the top 2 PoIs
as the linking standard, which typically correspond to home and work addresses.
Similarly, the consistency and persistence of a user’s PoIs are also reflected on its
AP clusters and frequently-used IP addresses. This property allows us to establish






















Table 3.2: DLG considers the linkability introduced by 10 types of OS-level information
and 3 IPC channels.
3.3.4 DLG: A Mobile OS Extension
DLG gives us the capability to construct cross-app linkability from runtime be-
haviors of the apps. Here, we introduce how it can be implemented as an extension
to current mobile operating systems, using Android as an illustrative example. We
also considered other implementation options, such as user-level interception (Aura-
sium [110]) or dynamic OS instrumentation (Xposed Framework [109]). The former
is insecure since the extension resides in the attacker’s address space and the latter
is not comprehensive because it cannot handle the native code of an app. However,
the developer can always implement a useful subset of DLG using one of these more
deployable techniques.
Android Basics Android is a Linux-based mobile OS developed by Google. By
default, each app is assigned a different Linux uid and lives in its own sandbox. Inter-
Process Communications (IPCs) are provided across different sandboxes, based on
the Binder protocol which is inherently a lightweight RPC (Remote Procedure Call)
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Figure 3.2: We instrument system services (red shaded region) to record which app accessed
which identifier using Wi-Fi service as an example.
Figure 3.3: We extend the centralized intent filter implemented in the Android framework
(com.android.server.firewall.IntentFirewall) to intercept all the Intents across
apps.
mechanism. There are four different types of components in an Android app: Activity,
Service, Content Provider, and Broadcast Receiver. Each component represents a
different way to interact with the underlying system: Activity corresponds to a single
screen supporting user interactions; Service runs in the background to perform long-
running operations and processing; Content Provider is responsible for managing
and querying of persistent data such as database; and Broadcast Receiver listens to
system-wide broadcasts and filters those it is interested in. Next, we describe how
we instrument the Android framework to monitor app’s interactions with the system
and each other via these components.
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Figure 3.4: We instrument Content Provider (shaded region) to record which app accessed
which database with what parameters.
Implementation Details In order to construct a DLG in Android, we need to
track apps’ access to various OS-level information as well as IPCs between apps.
Next, we describe how we achieve this by instrumenting different components of the
Android framework.
Apps access most identifying information, such as IMEI and MAC, by interact-
ing with different system services. These system services are parts of the Android
framework and have clear interfaces defined in AIDL (Android Interface Definition
Language). By instrumenting the public functions in each service that return persis-
tent identifiers, we can have a timestamped record of which app accessed what type
of identifying information via which service. Fig. 3.2 gives a detailed view of where
to instrument using the Wi-Fi service as an example.
On the other hand, apps access some identifying information, such as Android ID,
by querying the content providers maintained by the system. Android framework has
a universal choke point for all access to remote content providers — the server-side
stub class ContentProvider.Transport. By instrumenting this class, we know which
database (uri) an app is accessing and with what parameters and actions. Fig. 3.4
illustrates how an app accesses remote Content Provider and explains which part to
modify in order to log the information we need.
Apps can launch IPCs explicitly, using Intents. Intent is an abstract description
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of an operation to be performed. It can either be sent to a specific target (app compo-
nent), or broadcast to the entire system. The Android framework provides a central-
ized filter which enforces system-wide policies for all Intents. We choose to extend this
filter (com.android.server.firewall.IntentFirewall) to record and intercept all
Intent communications across apps (see Fig. 3.3). In addition to Intents, Android also
allows an app to communicate explicitly with another app by binding to one of the ser-
vices it exports. Once the binding is established, the two apps can communicate under
a client-server model. We instrument com.android.server.am.ActiveServices in
the Activity Manager to monitor all the attempts to establish service bindings across
apps.
Apps can also conduct IPCs implicitly by exploiting shared persistent storage.
For example, two apps can write and read the same file in the SD card to exchange
identifying information. Therefore, we need to monitor read and write access to
persistent storage. External storage in Android are wrapped by a FUSE (Filesystem
in Userspace) daemon which enables user-level permission control. By modifying this
daemon, we can track which app reads or writes which files (see Fig. 3.5). This allows
us to implement a Read-Write monitor which captures implicit communications via
reading a file which has previously been written by another app. Besides external
storage, our Read-Write monitor also considers similar indirect communications via
system Content Providers.
We described how to monitor all formal ways an app can interact with system
components (Services, Content Providers) and other apps (Intents, service bindings,
and indirect RW). This methodology is fundamental and can be extended to cover
other potential linkability sources (beyond our list) as long as a clear definition is
given. By placing hooks at the aforementioned locations in the system framework,
we get all the information needed to construct a DLG. For our measurement study,
we simply log and upload these statistics to a remote server for analysis. In our
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Figure 3.5: We customize the FUSE daemon under /system/core/sdcard/sdcard.c to
intercept apps’ access to shared external storage.
countermeasure solutions, these are used locally to derive dynamic defense decisions.
3.4 Linkability in Real World
In this section, we study app-level linkability in the real world. We first present an
overview of linkability, showing the current threats we’re facing. Then, we go through
the linkability sources and analyze to what extent each of the sources is contributing
to the linkability. Finally, we shed light on how these sources can be or have been
exploited for reasons unrelated to app functionalities. This paves the way for us to
develop a practical countermeasure.
3.4.1 Deployment and Settings
We prototyped DLG on Cyanogenmod 11 (based on Android 4.4.1) and installed
the extended OS on 7 Samsung Galaxy IV devices and 6 Nexus V devices. We
recruited 13 participants from the students and staff in our institution, spanning
over 8 different academic departments. Of the 13 participants, 6 of the participants
are females and 7 are males. Before using our experimental devices, 7 of them were
Android users and 6 were iPhone users. Participants are asked to operate their devices
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average
Figure 3.6: For an average user, more than 80% of the apps are installed in the first two
weeks after deployment; each app accesses most of the linkability sources it’s interested in
during the first day of its installation.
turn off our extension if they want more privacy when performing certain tasks. Logs
are uploaded once per hour when the device is connected to Wi-Fi. We exclude built-
in system apps (since the mobile OS is assumed to be benign in our threat model)
and consider only third-party apps that are installed by the users themselves. Note
that our study is limited in its size and the results may not generalize.
3.4.2 Data and Findings
We observed a total of 215 unique apps during a 47-day period for 13 users. On
average, each user installed 26 apps and each app accessed 4.8 different linkability
sources. We noticed that more than 80% of the apps are installed within the first two
weeks after deployment, and apps would access most of the linkability sources they
are interested in during the first day of their installation (see Fig. 3.6). This suggests
that a relative short-term (a few weeks) measurement would be enough to capture a
representative view of the problem.
Overview: Our measurement indicates an alarming view of the threat: two random
apps are linkable with a probability of 0.81, and an adversary only needs to control 2.2
apps (0.2 additional app), on average, to link them. This means that an adversary in











































































% of apps accessing each source
Figure 3.7: The percentage of apps accessing each source, and the linkability (LR) an app
can get by exploiting each source.
efforts (i.e., controlling a third app). Specifically, we found that 86% of the apps a
user installed on his device are directly linkable to the Facebook app, namely, his real
identity. This means almost all the activities a user exhibited using mobile apps are
identifiable, and can be linked to the real person.
Breakdown by Source: This vast linkability is contributed by various sources in
the mobile ecosystem. Here, we report the percentage of apps accessing each source
and the linkability (LR) an app can acquire by exploiting each source. The results
are provided in Fig. 3.7. We observed that except for device identifiers, many other
sources contributed to the linkability substantially. For example, an app can be
linked to 39% of all installed apps (LR=0.39) using only account information, and
36% (LR=0.36) using only Intents. The linkability an app can get from a source
is roughly equal to the percentage of apps that accessed that source, except for the
case of contextual information: IP, Location and Nearby APs. This is because the
contextual information an app collected does not always contain effectively identifying
information. For example, Yelp is mostly used at infrequent locations to find nearby

























































































Figure 3.8: The (average) Linking Efforts (LE) of all the apps that are linkable due to a
certain linkability source.
location information useless in establishing linkability with Yelp.
The effort required to aggregate two apps also differs for different linkability
sources, as shown in Fig. 3.8. Device identifiers have LE=0, meaning that any two
apps accessing the same device identifier can be directly aggregated without requiring
control of an additional third app. Linking apps using IPC channels, such as Intents
and Indirect RW, requires the adversary to control an average of 0.6 additional app as
the connecting nodes. This indicates that, from an adversary’s perspective, exploiting
consistent identifiers is easier than building pair-wise associations.
Breakdown by Category: We group the linkability sources into four categories
— device, personal, contextual, and IPC — and study the linkability contributed by
each category (see Table 3.3). As expected, device-specific information introduces
substantial linkability and allows the adversary to conduct across-app aggregation ef-
fortlessly. Surprisingly, the other three categories of linkability sources also introduce
considerable linkability. In particular, only using fuzzy contextual information, an
adversary can link more than 40% of the installed apps to Facebook, the user’s real
identity. This suggests the naive solution of anonymizing device ids is not enough,
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Category GLR GLE LRFacebook
Device 0.52 (0.13) 0.03 (0.03) 0.68 (0.12)
Personal 0.30 (0.10) 0.30 (0.11) 0.54 (0.11)
Contextual 0.20 (0.13) 0.33 (0.20) 0.44 (0.25)
IPC 0.32 (0.13) 0.78 (0.06) 0.59 (0.15)
Table 3.3: Linkability contributed by different categories of sources.
<?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’utf -8’ standalone=’yes’ ?>
<map>
<long name="timestamp" value="1419049777098" />
<long name="t2" value="1419049776889" />
<string name="UTDID">VJT7MTV268gDACiZN6xEh8af </string >
<string name="DID">356565055348652 </string >
<long name="S" value="1634341681" />
<string name="SI">310260981039000 </string >
<string name="EI">356565055348652 </string >
</map>
Figure 3.9: Real-world example of indirect RW: an app (fm.qingting.qradio) writes user
identifiers to an xml file in SD card which was later read by three other apps. This file
contains the IMEI (DID) and SubscriberID (SI) of the user.
and hence a comprehensive solution is needed to make a trade-off between app func-
tionality and privacy.
3.4.3 Functional Analysis
Device identifiers (IMEI, Android ID, MAC) introduce vast amount of linkabil-
ity. We manually went through 162 mobile apps that request these device-specific
identifiers, but could rarely identify any explicit functionality that requires accessing
the actual identifier. In fact, for the majority of these apps, their functionalities are
device-independent, and therefore independent of device IDs. This indicates that
device-specific identifier can be obfuscated across apps without noticeable loss of app
functionality. The only requirement for device ID is that it should be unique to each
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device.
As to personal information (Account Number, Phone Number, Installed Apps,
etc.), we also observed many unexpected accesses that resulted in unnecessary linka-
bility. We found that many apps that request account information collected all user
accounts even when they only needed one to function correctly; many apps request
access to phone number even when it is unrelated to their app functionalities. Since
the legitimacy of a request depends both on the user’s functional needs and the spe-
cific app context, end-users should be prompted about the access and make the final
decision.
The linkability introduced by contextual information (Location, Nearby AP) also
requires better regulation. Many apps request permission for precise location, but not
all of them actually need it to function properly. In many scenarios, apps only require
coarse-grained location information and shouldn’t reveal any identifying points of
interest (PoIs). Nearby AP information, which is only expected to be used by Wi-
Fi tools/managing apps, is also abused for other purposes. We noticed that many
apps frequently collect Nearby AP information to build an internal mapping between
locations and access points (APs). For example, we found that even if we turn off all
system location services, WeChat (an instant messaging app) can still infer the user’s
location only with Nearby AP information. To reduce the linkability introduced by
these unexpected usages, the users should have finer-grained control on when and
how the contextual information can be used.
Moreover, we found that IPC channels can be exploited in various ways to es-
tablish linkability across apps. Apps can establish linkabililty using Intents, sharing
and aggregating app-specific information. For instance, we observed that WeChat re-
ceives Intents from three different apps right after their installations, reporting their
existence on the same device. Apps can also establish linkability with each other via
service binding. For example, both AdMob and Facebook allow an app to bind to
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its service and exchanging the user identifier, completely bypassing the system per-
missions and controls. Apps can also establish linkabililty through Indirect RW, by
writing and reading the same persistent file. Fig. 3.9 shows a real-world example: an
app (fm.qingting.qradio) writes user identifiers to an xml file in the SD card which
was later read by three other apps. The end-user should be promptly warned about
these unexpected communications across apps to reduce unnecessary linkability.
3.5 LinkDroid: A Practical Countermeasure
Based on our observation and findings on linkability across real-world apps, we
propose a practical countermeasure, LinkDroid, on top of DLG. We first introduce the
basic design principle of LinkDroid and its three major privacy-enhancing features:
install-time obfuscation, runtime linkability monitoring, and unlinkable mode support.
We then evaluate the effectiveness of LinkDroid with the same set of participants as
in our measurement study.
Figure 3.10: An overview of LinkDroid. Shaded areas (red) represent the parts we need
to extend/add in Android. (We already explained how to extend A, B, C and D in Sec-
tion 3.3.4.)
3.5.1 Design Overview
LinkDroid is designed with practicality in mind. Numerous extensions, paradigms
and ecosystems have been proposed for mobile privacy, but access control (runtime for
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iOS and install-time for Android) is the only deployed mechanism. LinkDroid adds a
new dimension to access control on smartphone devices. Unlike existing approaches
that check if some app behavior poses direct privacy threats, LinkDroid warns users
about how it implicitly builds the linkability across apps. This helps users reduce un-
necessary links introduced by abusing OS-level information and IPCs, which happens
frequently in reality as our measurement study indicated.
As shown in Fig. 3.10, LinkDroid provides runtime monitoring and mediation of
linkability by
• monitoring and intercepting app behaviors that may introduce linkability (in-
cluding interactions with various system services, content providers, shared ex-
ternal storage and other apps);
• querying a standalone linkability service to get the user’s decision regarding this
app behavior;
• prompting the user about the potential risk if the user has not yet made a
decision, getting his decision and updating the linkability graph (DLG).
We have already described in Section 3.3.4 how to instrument the Android frame-
work to build the monitoring components (corresponding to boxes A, B, C, D in
Fig. 3.10). In this section, we focus on how the linkability service operates.
3.5.2 Install-Time Obfuscation
As mentioned earlier, app functionalities are largely independent of device identi-
fiers. This allows us to obfuscate these identifiers and cut off many unnecessary edges
in the DLG. In our case, the list of device identifiers includes IMEI, Android ID and
MAC. Every time an app gets installed, the linkability service receives the app’s uid
and then generates a random mask code for it. The mask code together with the
types of obfuscated device identifiers will be pushed into the decision database. This
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way, when an app a tries to fetch the device identifier of a certain type t, it will only
get a hash of the real identifier salted with the app-specific mask code:
IDat = hash(IDt +maska).
Note that we do this at install-time instead of during each session because we
still want to guarantee the relative consistency of the device identifiers within each
app. Otherwise, it will let the app think the user is switching to a different device
and trigger some security/verification mechanisms. The user can always cancel this
default obfuscation in the privacy manager (Fig. 3.12) if he finds it necessary to reveal
real device identifiers to certain apps.
3.5.3 Runtime Linkability Monitoring
Except for device-specific identifiers, obfuscating other sources of linkability is
likely to interfere with the app functionalities. Whether there is a functional interfer-
ence or not is highly user-specific and context-dependent. To make a useful trade-off,
the user should be involved in this decision-making process. Here, LinkDroid pro-
vides just-in-time prompts before an edge creates in the DLG. Specifically, if the
linkability service could not find an existing decision regarding some app behavior,
it will issue the user a prompt, informing him: 1) what app behavior triggers the
prompt; 2) what’s the quantitative risk of allowing this behavior; and 3) what’re the
opt-out options. Fig. 3.11 gives an illustrative example of the UI of the prompt.
Description of App Behavior Before the user can make a decision, he first needs
to know what app behavior triggers the prompt. Basically, we report two types of
description: access to OS-level information and cross-app communications. To help
the user understand the situation, we use a high-level descriptive language instead of
the exact technical terms. For example, when an app tries to access Subscriber ID or
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Figure 3.11: The UI prompt of LinkDroid’s runtime access control, consisting of a behav-
ioral description, descriptive and quantitative risk indicators, and opt-out options.
IccSerialNumber, we report that “App X asks for sim-card information.” When an
app tries to send Intents to other apps, we report “App X tries to share content with
App Y”. During our experiments with real users (introduced later in the evaluation),
11 out of the 13 participants find these descriptions clear and informative.
Risk Indicator LinkDroid reports two types of risk indicators to users: one is
descriptive and the other is quantitative. The descriptive indicator tells what apps
will be directly linkable to an app if the user allows its current behavior. By ‘directly
linkable,’ we mean without requiring a third app as the connecting nodes. The quan-
titative indicator, on the other hand, reflects the influence on the overall linkability of
the running app, including those apps that are not directly linkable to it. Here, the
overall linkability is reported as a combination of the linking ratio (LR) and linking
effort (LE):
La = LRa × e−LEa .
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Figure 3.12: LinkDroid provides a centralized linkability manager. The user can review
and modify all of his previous decisions regarding each app.
The quantitative risk indicator is defined as ∆La. A user will be warned of a
larger risk if the total number of linkable apps significantly increases, or the average
linking effort decreases substantially. We transform the quantitative risk linearly into
a scale of 4 and report the risk as Low, Medium, High, and Severe.
Opt-out Options In each prompt, the user has at least two options: Allow or
Deny. If the user chooses Deny, LinkDroid will obfuscate the information this app
tries to get or shut down the communication channel this app requests. For some types
of identifying information, such as Accounts and Location, we provide finer-grained
trade-offs. For Location, the user can select from zip-code level (1km) or city-level
(10km) precision; for Accounts, the user can choose which specific account he wants
to share instead of exposing all his accounts. LinkDroid also allows the user to set
up a VPN (Virtual Private Network) service to anonymize network identifiers. When
the user switches from a cellular network to Wi-Fi, LinkDroid will automatically
initialize the VPN service to hide the user’s public IP. This may incur additional
energy consumption and latency (see Section 3.5.5). All choices made by the user will
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be stored in the decision database for future reuse. We provide a centralized privacy
manager such that the user can review and change all previously made decisions (see
Fig. 3.12).
3.5.4 Unlinkable Mode
Once a link is established in DLG, it cannot be removed. This is because once a
piece of identifying information is accessed or a communication channel is established,
it can never be revoked. However, the user may sometimes want to perform privacy-
preserving tasks which have no interference with the links that have already been
introduced. For example, when the user wants to write an anonymous post in Reddit,
he doesn’t want it to be linkable with any of his previous posts as well as other apps.
LinkDroid provides an unlinkable mode to meet such a need. The user can start
an app in unlinkable mode by pressing its icon for long in the app launcher. A new
uid as well as isolated storage will be allocated to this unlinkable app instance. By
default, access to all OS-level identifying information and inter-app communications
will be denied. This way, LinkDroid creates the illusion that this app has just been
installed on a brand-new device. The unlinkable mode allows LinkDroid to provide
finer-grained (session-level) control, unlinking only a certain set of app sessions.
3.5.5 Evaluation
We evaluate LinkDroid in terms of its overheads in usability and performance,
as well as its effectiveness in reducing linkability. We replay the traces of the 13
participants of our measurement study (see Section 3.4), prompt them about the
privacy threat and ask for their decisions. This gives us the exact picture of the same
set of users using LinkDroid during the same period of time. We instruct the user
to make a decision in the most conservative way: the user will Deny a request only



























































Figure 3.14: The Global Linking Ratio (GLR) of different users before and after using
LinkDroid.
otherwise, he will Accept the request.
The overhead of LinkDroid mainly comes from two parts: the usability burden of
dealing with UI prompts and the performance degradation of querying the linkability
service. Our experimental results show that, on average, each user was prompted
only 1.06 times per day during the 47-day period. The performance degradation
introduced by the linkability service is also marginal. It only occurs when apps access
certain OS-level information or conduct cross-app IPCs. These sensitive operations
happened rather infrequently — once every 12.7 seconds during our experiments.
These results suggest that LinkDroid has limited impact on system performance and
usability.
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We found that after applying LinkDroid, the Global Linking Ratio (GLR) dropped
from 81% to 21%. Fig. 3.13 shows the breakdown of linkability drop in different cat-
egories of sources. The majority of the remaining linkability comes from inter-app
communications, most of which are genuine from the user’s perspective. Not only
fewer apps are linkable, LinkDroid also makes it harder for an adversary to aggre-
gate information from two linkable apps. The Global Linking Effort (GLE) increases
significantly after applying LinkDroid: from 0.22 to 0.68. Specifically, the percentage
of apps that are directly linkable to Facebook dropped from 86% to 18%. Fig. 3.15
gives an illustrative example of how DLG changes after applying LinkDroid. We
also noticed that that the effectiveness of LinkDroid differs across users, as shown in
Fig. 3.14. In general, LinkDroid is more effective for the users who have diverse mo-
bility patterns, are cautious about sharing information across apps and/or maintain
different accounts for different services.
LinkDroid takes VPN as a plug-in solution to obfuscate network identifiers. The
potential drawback of using VPN is its influence on device energy consumption and
network latency. We measured the device energy consumption of using VPN on a
Samsung Galaxy 4 device, with Monsoon Power Monitor. Specifically, we tested two
network-intensive workloads: online videos and browsing. We observed a 5% increase
in energy consumption for the first workload, and no observable difference for the
second. To measure the network latency, we measured the ping time (average of 10
trials) to Alexa Top 20 domains and found a 13% increase (17ms). These results
indicate that the overhead of using VPN on smartphone device is noticeable but not
significant. Seven of 13 participants in our evaluation were willing to use VPN services
to achieve better privacy.
We interviewed the 13 participants after the experiments. Questions are designed
on a scale of 1 to 5 and a score of 4 or higher is regarded as “agree.” Eleven of




Figure 3.15: DLG of a representative user before (a) and after (b) applying
LinkDroid. Red circle represents the Facebook app.
use LinkDroid on a daily basis to inform them about the risk and provide opt-out
options. However, these responses might not be representative due to the limited
size and diversity of the participants. We also noticed that users care a lot about
the linkability of sensitive apps, such as Snapchat and Facebook. Some participants
clearly state that they do not want any app to be associated with the Facebook
app, except for very necessary occasions. This also supports the rationale behind the
design of LinkDroid’s unlinkable mode.
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3.6 Related Work
There have been other proposals [29, 60] which also address the privacy threats of
information aggregation by mobile apps. They shift the responsibility of information
personalization and aggregation from mobile apps to the mobile OS or trusted cloud
providers, requiring re-development of mobile apps and extensive modifications on
the entire mobile ecosystem. In contrast, LinkDroid is a client-side solution which
is compatible with existing ecosystem — it focuses on characterizing the threat in
current mobile ecosystem and making a practical trade-off, instead of proposing new
computation (advertising) paradigm.
Existing studies investigated linkability under several domain-specific scenarios.
Arvind et al. [79] showed that a user’s profile in Netflix can be effectively linked to
his in IMDB, using long-tailed (unpopular) movies. Sebastian et al. [58] described
how to link the profiles of the same user in different social networks using friends
topologies. This type of linkability is restricted to a small scope, and may only exist
across different apps in the same domain. Here, we focus on the linkability that are
domain-independent and ubiquitous to all apps, regardless of the type and semantics
of each app.
The capability of advertising agency on conducting profiling and aggregation has
been extensively studied [45, 98]. Various countermeasures have been proposed, such
as enforcing finer-grained isolation between ad library and the app [86, 95], or adopting
a privacy-preserving advertising paradigm [10]. However, unlike LinkDroid, they only
consider a very specific and restricted scenario — advertising library — which involves
few functional trade-offs. LinkDroid, instead, introduces a general linkability model,
considers various sources of linkability and suits a diverse set of adversaries.
There have also been numerous studies on information access control on smart-
phone [18, 31, 33, 49, 53, 81, 101]. Many of these studies have already proposed to pro-
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vide apps with fake identifiers and other types of sensitive information [49, 81, 109].
These studies focus on the explicit privacy concern of accessing and leaking sensi-
tive user information, by malicious mobile apps or third-party libraries. Our work
addresses information access control from a very different perspective, investigating
the implicit linkability introduced by accessing various OS-level information and IPC
channels.
Many modern browsers provide a private (incognito) mode. These are used to
defend against local attackers, such as users sharing the same computer, from steal-
ing cookies or browse history from each other [3]. This is inherently different from
LinkDroid’s unlinkable mode which targets unregulated aggregation by remote at-
tackers.
3.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we proposed a new metric, linkability, to quantify the ability of
different apps to link and aggregate their usage behaviors. This metric, albeit useful,
is only a coarse upper-bound of the actual privacy threat, especially in the case of
IPCs. Communication between two apps does not necessarily mean that they have
conducted, or are capable of conducting, information aggregation. However, deciding
on the actual intention of each IPC is by itself a difficult task. It requires an automatic
and extensible way of conducting semantic introspection on IPCs, and is a challenging
research problem on its own.
LinkDroid aims to reduce the linkability introduced covertly without the user’s
consent or knowledge — it couldn’t and doesn’t try to eliminate the linkability explic-
itly introduced by users. For example, a user may post photos of himself or exhibit
very identifiable purchasing behavior in two different apps, thus establishing link-
ability. This type of linkability is app-specific, domain-dependent and beyond the
control of LinkDroid. Identifiability or linkability of these domain-specific usage be-
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haviors are of particular interest to other areas, such as anonymous payment [106],
anonymous query processing [77] and data anonymization techniques.
The list of identifying information we considered in this work is well-formatted
and widely-used. These ubiquitous identifiers contribute the most to information ag-
gregation, since they are persistent and consistent across different apps. We didn’t
consider some uncommon identifiers, such as walking patterns and microphone signa-
tures, because we haven’t yet observed any real-world adoption of these techniques by
commercial apps. However, LinkDroid can easily include other types of identifying
information, as long as a clear definition is given.
DLG introduces another dimension — linkability — to privacy protection on mo-
bile OS and has some other potential usages. For example, when the user wants
to perform a certain task in Android and has multiple optional apps, the OS can
recommend him to choose the app which is the least linkable with others. We also
noticed some interesting side-effect of LinkDroid’s unlinkable mode. Since unlinkable
mode allows users to enjoy finer-grained (session-level) unlinkability, it can be used
to stop a certain app from continuously identifying a user. This can be exploited to
infringe the benefits of app developers in the case of copyright protection, etc. For
example, NYTimes only allows an unregistered user to read up to 10 articles every
month. However, by restarting the app in unlinkable mode in each session, a user can
stop NYTimes from linking himself across different sessions and bypass this quota
restriction.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we addressed the privacy threat of unregulated aggregation from a
new perspective by monitoring, characterizing and reducing the underlying linkability
across apps. This allows us to measure the potential threat of unregulated aggregation
during runtime and promptly warn users of the associated risks. We observed how
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real-world apps abuse OS-level information and IPCs to establish linkability, and
proposed a practical countermeasure, LinkDroid. It provides runtime monitoring
and mediation of linkability across apps, introducing a new dimension to privacy
protection on mobile device. Our evaluation on real users has shown that LinkDroid is
effective in reducing the linkability across apps and only incurs marginal overheads.
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CHAPTER IV
Enabling Unlinkability of Mobile Apps in
User-level
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we systematically studied the issue of unregulated aggregation
of mobile app usages, when a curious party covertly links and aggregates a user’s be-
havioral information collected from independent sources — across sessions and apps
— without his consent or knowledge. The severity and prevalence of this threat are
rooted at the nonexistence of unlinkability in the smartphone ecosystem. By exploit-
ing various levels of consistency provided by device identifiers, software cookies, IPs,
local and external storages, an adversary can easily correlate app usages of the same
user and aggregate supposed-to-be ‘isolated islands of information’ into a comprehen-
sive user profile, irrespective of the user’s choice and (dis)approval. However, from
the user’s perspective, only app usages that are functionally-dependent should be
linkable. For example, for GTalk, app usages under the same login should be linkable
to provide a consistent messaging service. For Angry Birds, usage of the same app
should be linkable to allow the user to resume from where he stopped. In contrast,
for most query-like apps, such as Bing and Wikipedia, which neither enforce an ex-
plicit login nor require consistent long-term ‘memories’, app usages should be globally
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unlinkable by default.
Moreover, existing mobile OS vendors may be unlikely to adopt changes/exten-
sions that can improve the privacy of users because the entire mobile ecosystem is
fueled by the abundance of user information. To bridge this gap in a timely manner,
we propose Mask, the first user-level solution that allows the user to negotiate to what
extent his behavior can be linked and aggregated. Specifically, Mask introduces a set
of private execution modes that allow the users to maintain multiple isolated profiles
for each app. Each app profile can be temporary, being recycled after each session,
or enduring, persists across multiple sessions. Upon invocation of each app, a user
can apply one of the following modes to the current app session (from the start to
termination of the app), according to his usage scenario. If he wants to:
• Use this app while logged in, choose the identifiable mode. All app usages under
the same login are now linkable and the app delivers uncompromised personal
services while disallowing aggregation across unrelated apps.
• Keep states or use the states saved before, apply the pseudonymous mode. In
this mode, a user can maintain multiple profiles and only app usages in the
same profile are linkable.
• Execute this app without leaving any trace, apply the anonymous mode. Each
session is treated as independent and app usages are confined within the current
session.
All user behaviors originate from the mobile apps, either directly or indirectly.
By enabling the aforementioned private execution modes which isolate app usages at
this very source, Mask provides a client-side solution without requiring any change to
the existing ecosystem. We have implemented Mask on Android at user level, without
requiring any modifications on the Android framework. This is achieved by enforcing
a lightweight user-level sandbox that creates an isolated runtime environment with
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stripped account information, anonymized device IDs & software cookies, and isolated
persistent storage. Our solution is able to bring privacy benefits to more than 70% of
the apps and incurs negligible overhead in the app’s runtime performance. Our user
study on 27 users find that more than 60% of them find it useful to maintain multiple
isolated profiles for mobile apps and 11 of them are willing to use this feature on a
daily basis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
background of unregulated aggregation of mobile app usages with a focus on the prac-
tical challenges encountered. Section 4.3 presents a high-level design of Mask, while
Section 4.4 describes our user-level implementation on Android as well as some eval-
uation results. Section 4.5 covers the related work, and finally Section 4.6 concludes
the chapter.
4.2 Background & Challenges
4.2.1 Unregulated Aggregation
In current mobile ecosystems, an interested/curious party can covertly link and
aggregate app usages of the same user over time, without his consent or knowledge,
which we call unregulated aggregation of app usages. Here, we describe three major
adversaries — mobile apps, A&A agencies, and network sniffers — and show how
they aggregate app usages in practice.
4.2.1.1 Smartphone Applications
Smartphone apps aggregate users’ app usages mainly for personalization. By
tracking app usages over time and feeding them to domain-specific mining/learning
algorithms, smartphone apps can deliver contents tailored to each user. Even if
a user doesn’t give an explicit consent (by logging in), apps can still identify and
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aggregate usages of the same user. In fact, if only for the purpose of user tracking,
mobile apps have options far easier and simpler than enforcing login. Specifically, a
smartphone app can use device IDs or system IDs, such as IMEI and Android ID,
as a consistent user identity to aggregate his app usages remotely on the server, or
exploit the consistent & persistent storage on the device and achieve the same goal
locally.
4.2.1.2 Advertising & Analytics Agencies
To enable targeted advertising, A&A agencies are also interested in aggregating
personal interests and demographics disclosed in app usages. Specifically, app devel-
opers include clients of these ad agencies—ad libraries—into their apps and proac-
tively feed sensitive information requested by these libraries [98]. Moreover, since
an ad library shares the same permission with its host app, it can also access and
collect private information on its own. To identify and aggregate information of the
same user, third-party libraries embed user identifiers into the traffic they send to
the back-end servers. Such a user identifier can be the hash value of a device/system
ID or a local cookie. These A&A agencies can be more dangerous than smartphone
apps as they can aggregate usage behaviors across multiple apps carrying the same
library.
4.2.1.3 Network Sniffers
Unlike the aforementioned parties, a network sniffer cannot collect information
directly from the user’s device on its own and can only extract information from raw
network traffic. Moreover, from the sniffer’s perspective, the network traffic can be
really messy: some are directly marked with the actual device ID, some are tagged
with hashed ones, some only embed app-specific ID (such as a craigslist user ID)
while some others are encrypted and completely useless. However, as MOSAIC [108]
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Figure 4.1: How usages in different app sessions (circles in the figure) are collected, aggre-
gated and propagated by smartphone apps, A&A agencies and network sniffers.
shows, by exploiting the relative consistency of IP, it can associate different IDs
that represent the same user. This way, even the traffic marked with different and
seemingly unrelated user IDs can be aggregated. As publicized recently, a similar
technique is used by government agencies (e.g., US NSA and GCHQ) for public
surveillance.
In summary, these parties have an increasing scope of information collection and
aggregation, and decreasing control on the client side (mobile device). Besides, they’re
not independent parties, but operate more like subordinates of an integrated adver-
sary. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the information flow among these parties.
4.2.2 Practical Challenges
The following practical challenges need to be addressed when developing a solu-
tion.
4.2.2.1 Intermingled Interests of Different Parties
Free apps dominate mobile app stores with 91% of the overall downloads [1], and
app developers include ad libraries to monetize these free apps. Therefore, smart-
phone apps share the same financial interest with A&A agencies, and should thus not
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be trusted. In fact, smartphone apps may deliberately collude with A&A agencies and
feed them user demographics, such as age and gender, which ad libraries wouldn’t be
able to know on their own. On the other hand, OS vendors, whose popularity highly
depends on the activeness of app developers, are reluctant to add privacy-enhancing
features that may undermine the app developers’ financial interests. Therefore, any
defense that requires extensive OS-level modifications/cooperations will be impracti-
cal and not deployable.
4.2.2.2 Overpopulated User Identifiers
Unlike the web case where users are usually identified and tracked using cookies,
smartphone apps have much more choices. Exploiting the consistency provided by
numerous device and system IDs (some of which do not even require a permission
to access), they can track app users both consistently and persistently. Moreover,
since apps have arbitrary control over their persistent storage, they can perform local
aggregation of users’ information which doesn’t even require any type of ID.
4.2.2.3 Trade-off between Functionality & Privacy
Enhancement of privacy often implies sacrifice of functionality. Similarly, opt-out
unregulated aggregation, while providing a better privacy guarantee, also impairs
personalized user experience. This trade-off, instead of being context-invariant, is
subject to an app’s nature as well as the user’s preference. Thus, one must make a
useful and adjustable trade-off between privacy and functionality.
These fundamental issues greatly reduce the set of tools and techniques a practical
solution can use, rendering most existing proposals ineffective in practical settings (see
Section 5 for the state-of-art).
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4.3 MASK: A Client-side Design
4.3.1 Basic Design Idea
The basic idea behind Mask’s design is to allow only those app usages that are
functionally dependent on each other to be linkable while keeping others unlinkable
by default. This is achieved by introducing a set of private execution modes through
which app users can provide explicit consent, on whether and within which scope the
app usages in current session can be aggregated. The private execution modes are
introduced based on our observation of how apps are actually used. Specifically, we
first classify app-usage scenarios according to the levels of linkability required by app
functionality and then introduce different private execution modes according to these
app usage patterns.
4.3.2 App Usage Patterns
In Mask, the basic unit of a user’s app usage is session, which represents a series
of continuous active interactions between the user and an app to achieve a specific
function. On Android, this typically corresponds to the activities between the invoca-
tions of function calls onCreate and onDestroy. The duration of a session is relatively
short. Therefore, personal information in a single session can be very limited, and
hence, different parties are devoted to linking and aggregating different sessions of
the same user.
Mask classifies app usage patterns depending on whether and to what extent app
usages in different sessions should be linkable. The three app usage patterns intro-
duced below—stateless, durative and exclusive—characterize app’s increasing need on
the level of consistency in its runtime environment.
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4.3.2.1 Stateless Pattern
the user’s activity in one session does not depend strongly on the states of, and
information from other sessions. By ‘not strongly’, we mean the the app is able to
deliver its main functionality without any information from previous sessions, possibly
at the expense of reducing optional personalized features. A wide spectrum of apps fit
this pattern, including query-like apps such as Wikipedia and Yelp, apps from most
news media such as NYTimes and CNN, and simple games such as Doodle Jumps
and Flappy Bird.
4.3.2.2 Durative Pattern
the user requires persistent states and long-term ‘memories’ of an app to perform
his current activities, but does not need to reveal his real-world identity. This pat-
tern fits note-keeping apps, music player, books & magazines, complex games with a
storyline or levels that need to be unlocked (such as Angry Birds), and etc.
4.3.2.3 Exclusive Pattern
the user must execute the app with an explicit identity, such as a user ID or ac-
count, and is willing to take the accompanied privacy risk. It covers most of social
apps, such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as communication apps including What-
sApp, Yahoo Messenger, etc. If an app fits this pattern, the corresponding usages
can and should be linkable across all the sessions that share the same account.
Note that the different users might apply different patterns when using the same
app. This is subject to the preference of each specific user.
4.3.3 Aligning Usage Pattern with Privacy
Let’s first discuss the default scenario in a contemporary mobile OS, using Android
as an example. An app can track a user via device IDs such as IMEI or MAC address,
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Table 4.1: The gap of linkability: Expectation vs. Reality
Scenario
Linkable
Across Sessions Across Apps
stateless single single
durative some - all single
exclusive all single - some
default (reality) all all
which typically require permission, or via system IDs such as SERIAL number and
android ID, which do not require any permission at all. If an app or an ad library
wants, it can always export a cookie to its local storage, or more persistently, to
external storage. These persistent anchors in the app’s runtime allow an adversary
to link and aggregate usage across all apps and sessions. However, from the user’s
perspective, this linkability is far too strong for most app functionalities.
For apps executed statelessly, linkability is not needed even in the weakest form
since each session is inherently independent. For apps executed duratively, linkability
is only needed across (some, not necessarily all) sessions of the same app—for example,
a user may wish to maintain two separate instances for the same gaming app. Even for
apps executed exclusively there are additional privacy issues. When a user executes
an app with login, its app usages should only be linkable within the app, or at most
across apps using the same login — instead of across all sessions and apps. Table 4.1
summarizes this gap between expectation and reality.
4.3.4 Private Execution Modes
Having understood the user’s requirement on linkability, we present an intuitive
way for the user to give explicit consent. Specifically, Mask introduces a set of private
execution modes. Whenever a user starts an app, he can choose which mode to apply
on the current session, implicitly specifying whether and within which scope his app


































Figure 4.2: Mask provides different private execution modes for each usage pattern we
classified and only app sessions that are functionally dependent on each other are linkable.
Mask provides three types of private execution modes—identifiable, pseudonymous
and anonymous—which are mapped to the three usage patterns we defined earlier and
provide increasing levels of unlinkability of the user’s app usages. An ordinary user
can make this decision by following a few simple rules, without any domain-specific
knowledge. Specifically, when an app starts execution and the user wants to:
• Use this app while logged in, he should choose the identifiable mode. Assuming
all app usages under the same login are linkable, Mask allows an app to deliver
uncompromised personal services while disallowing aggregation across unrelated
apps.
• Keep states or use the states saved before, he should apply the pseudonymous
mode. In this mode, a user can maintain multiple context-based profiles and
only app usages in the same profile are linkable.
• Execute this app without leaving any trace, he should apply the anonymous
mode. Each session is treated as independent and app usages are confined
within the current session.
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Fig. 4.2 presents an overview of Mask’s design. Note that our design is not re-
stricted to any specific mobile OS or platform since its rationality is rooted in the
general notions of app usage patterns. Different choices of Mask’s implementation only
reflect emphasis on different aspects, such as performance, robustness or practicality.
4.4 Implementation & Evaluation
The principle that drives every decision in our implementation is deployabil-
ity without any unrealistic dependencies or assumptions on other parties, such as
platform-level support or collaboration with A&A agencies. This is important be-
cause (1) the privacy threat under consideration is prevalent and needs to be dealt
with urgently and users should be given a choice to opt out right away; and (2) as
we discussed earlier, there exist intermingled benefits among different parties in the
current mobile app ecosystem and counting on any of them may degrade the practi-
cality of a solution. Guided by this principle, we developed a client-side prototype of
Mask on Android (4.1.1) at the user level. Next, we provide the technical details and
challenges of our user-level implementation.
4.4.1 User-Level Sandbox
To enable the aforementioned private execution modes, we need to provide an
isolated runtime environment. Since practicality is priority in our implementation
and users are less likely to use a custom ROM or root their device solely for privacy
protection, we need a user-level sandbox implementation.
As proposed by the system communities [100], the dynamic linking process can
be exploited to support program customization. Any dynamically linked executable
keeps a mapping between external function symbols and the corresponding memory
addresses, known as the global offset table (GOT). By rewriting entries in the GOT,
access to any external function symbols can be redirected to a user-specified function.
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This makes it possible to intercept library calls in user-level and deliver security and
privacy features [110].
We adopt this user-level technique to achieve two goals: intercepting inter-process
communications (IPCs) between system services and apps to strip personal and device
identifying information that enable aggregation at the server side; and provide an
isolated per-sandbox storage to break local (on-device) aggregation.
4.4.1.1 IPC (Intent) Interception
IPC is the only supported mechanism in Android that allows an app to interact
with other processes and exchange information. Any explicit communication, using
Intents, or implicit ones, such as getting information from system services using high-
level APIs, are supported by this IPC mechanism. To strip personal and device
identifying information an app could get, we need to be able to intercept, understand
and modify any IPCs between this app and other parties. This brings some technical
challenges and requires a good understanding of how IPC works in Android.
In Android, the design of IPC, Binder, is conceptually a lightweight RPC mecha-
nism which allows one process to invoke routines in another process. It consists of two
components: the shared library libbinder.so in user space and the Binder driver in
kernel space. They communicate with each other according to the Binder protocol
via the bionic libc call ioctl. All high-level objects such as Intents are packed into a
container object (Parcel) and then sent through the binder protocol as a byte array.
By intercepting the ioctl function call in libbinder.so, we can exercise arbitrary
user-level control. Specifically, we overwrite the GOT in libbinder.so and redirect
ioctl to a wrapper function. This wrapper allows us to intercept both incoming and
outgoing communications, both are indispensable to achieve our goal. Intercepting
outgoing traffic lets us know what request this app sends while intercepting the in-
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Figure 4.3: How to achieve Binder IPC interception.
process.
On top of this interception mechanism, we can impose control over any intra-
or inter-app communications as well as the app’s interactions with system compo-
nents. Here, we focus on the latter because in Android, identifying information is
centrally managed by system services. Table 4.2 summarizes the list of identifiers
Mask anonymizes. It contains the most commonly-used IDs but may not be a com-
plete list of all potential identifying information. However, the associated technical
underpinning is general enough to cover other identifiers, if necessary. We also exclude
quasi-identifiers, such as IP or location, because compared to the the explicit identi-
fiers addressed in Mask, they are far less consistent and reliable [11, 108], especially
in the mobile context. Moreover, there are already independent lines of research on
these subjects, such as IP anonymization and location anonymity.
4.4.1.2 Persistent Storage Isolation
Isolating persistent storage for each sandbox is necessary because it prevents local
aggregation of the user’s app usages, and also break the consistency of software cook-
ies. Android provides the following options for persistent storage: Shared Preferences,
Internal Storage, External Storage and SQLite Databases.
All of these storage options are built upon file system primitives provided by
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Figure 4.4: How to achieve persistent storage redirection/isolation.
Table 4.2: List of commonly-used identifiers Mask anonymizes
ID System Service Permission
IMEI/MEID iphonesubinfo READ PHONE STATE
SUBSCRIBER ID iphonesubinfo READ PHONE STATE
PHONE NUMBER iphonesubinfo READ PHONE STATE
MAC ADDR wifi ACCESS WIFI STATE
ACCOUNTS accounts GET ACCOUNTS
ANDROID ID settings NONE
SERIAL settings* NONE
Bionic Libc, such as open, stat, mkdir, chmod, etc. By intercepting these primitives
and modifying the corresponding input parameters, we can exercise arbitrary control
over the app’s interactions with the file system. Specifically, we create shadow direc-
tories which resemble the initial states of the app for each sandbox upon its creation,
and then redirect all upcoming file system operations from the app-specific directories
to the corresponding shadow directories. Figure. 4.4 illustrates this process.
4.4.2 Sandbox Manager
So far, we have introduced how a user-level sandbox is implemented to provide an
isolated runtime environment. Next, we describe how these sandboxes are created,
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executed and destroyed to deliver the private execution modes in Mask.
4.4.2.1 Sandbox Management
The lifecycle of each sandbox is centrally controlled by a sandbox manager. The
sandbox manager maintains a meta file for each sandbox, which contains sandbox-
specific parameters: paths to the designated shadow directories, anonymized values
of the persistent identifiers. When a sandbox is created, the manager generates a
sandbox-specific meta file and allocates it shadow directories both in the local storage
and the SD card. Then, any resources required for the initial states of this app will
be copied into the shadow directories. The sandbox is then ready to start. When a
sandbox is executed, the manager will initialize the runtime with information stored
in the sandbox’s meta file and activate the library-call interception mechanism. When
a sandbox is destroyed, the sandbox manager first clears the local storage designated
for the sandbox and then deletes the corresponding meta file.
Whenever an app is executed in anonymous mode, a new sandbox is created
and applied; the sandbox will be immediately destroyed after the current session
terminates. Note that, in Android, the termination of a session (onDestroy) is auto-
matically controlled/optimized by the system. The user can force the current session
to terminate by removing the app from the recent apps list. If an app is executed
in pseudonymous mode, the user can choose to reuse an existing sandbox or create
a new sandbox; a sandbox will only be destroyed when a user explicitly specifies it.
If an app is executed in identifiable mode, a designated sandbox gets initialized; the
user always runs the same sandbox.
4.4.2.2 Multi-process Support
For an app with only one process, its execution in a sandbox is simple; but for
apps with multiple processes, it can be complicated. Since what we implemented is
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Figure 4.5: The UI design of Mask.
a per-process sandbox and Android allows an app to host multiple processes, an app
will crash if different processes are executed with inconsistent runtime environment.
Therefore, we equip our sandbox with multi-process support. Each time an app
process starts, the sandbox manager will first tell whether a sandbox is already created
for this app (by maintaining a lock file in this app’s local storage). If so, the new
process will join the existing sandbox and share the same runtime environment.
4.4.2.3 UI Design
The logic of sandbox manager is hidden behind an intuitive UI. Mask’s UI is
displayed right before the launcher activity of an app starts, and is executed as an
independent process isolated from all other components of the app. It offers a nice and
intuitive way for end-users to manage profiles without revealing too much details. As
shown in Fig. 4.5, Mask provides three execution modes—identifiable, pseudonymous
and anonymous. For identifiable and anonymous modes, the user can simply click-
and-use; for pseudonymous mode, Mask allows the user to maintain multiple profiles
on the same device.
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4.4.3 APK Rewriter
So far, we described how to build a user-level sandbox in Android that provides
unlinkable runtime environments. Next, we describe how to merge our sandbox com-
ponent seamlessly into an app, using the APK rewriter we developed.
Specifically, we use apktool to decompile an Android application package file
(APK) into human-readable smali codes, include our sandbox component and then
recompile the files back into an executable APK. This is difficult because each APK is
an integral structure, and including our sandbox component is not as easy as copying
all the files — we have to make sure each component serves its designed functionality
at the right place, and this can be challenging especially when we need to consider
the integration of UI. This brings the following technical challenges:
4.4.3.1 Sandbox Initialization
The APK rewriter needs to make sure that the sandbox component will be ini-
tialized before any component of the original application executes. This is achieved
by exploiting an application base class which is provided by Android to maintain
global application states. The nice property of this base class is that it is the first
user-controlled component that gets initialized for any process of the app. Our APK
rewriter will go through the app’s existing codes and checks whether the application
base class already exists. If exists, we modify the existing application base and make
it a subclass of the application base defined by us; otherwise, we directly insert our
application base. The sandbox initialization logic is programmed into the static code
section of this application base class and is guaranteed to be the first to execute.
4.4.3.2 UI Integration
All UI elements integrated in an app are referenced with a universal unique id,
indexed under res/values/ids.xml and res/values/public.xml. To integrate new UI
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Table 4.3: UI & Sandbox Management Overhead
Category Response Time
Load UI 169.2 ms
Create Sandbox 68.7 ms
Run Sandbox 382.2 ms
Destroy Sandbox 26.8 ms
elements into an existing app, our APK rewriter automatically tracks and assigns
the empty slots within the existing ids. Moreover, the APK rewriter needs to ensure
control will be returned to the app after our UI cuts in line. It works by going
through the manifest file, identifying the app launcher activity and statically writing
an initialization logic for the launcher activity into the onDestroy functions in our
UI activity.
Finally, the APK rewriter also parses the manifest file to get the list of processes
this app hosts. This information will be hard-coded into the smali codes of the
sandbox manager to enable Mask’s support for multiple processes.
4.4.4 Performance Overhead
Mask incurs two types of performance overhead: on sandbox management when a
sandbox is created, destroyed or executed; and during application runtime, after an
app starts execution in a sandbox of the user’s choice.
The overheads on sandbox management are measured by instrumenting a testing
app with Mask and timers. Then we perform selected sandbox management tasks
and log the output of these timers. As the results in Table 4.3 show, the most
time-consuming actions in sandbox management are loading UI and running a sand-
box, each taking a few hundred milliseconds. However, since these actions happen
only once during a session, the cumulative overhead on sandbox management is still
minor—far less than one second.
The overhead on apps’ runtime originates from Mask’s user-level sandbox compo-
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Table 4.4: Mobile App Runtime Overhead
Category Bench Unit Overhead (%)
File
Seq Read MB/s < 1%
Seq Write MB/s 1.3%
Rand Read MB/s < 1%








Filter TPS < 1%
Reformat TPS 37.8%
TPS: Transactions Per Second
nent when it intercepts inter-process communications (IPCs) and file system oper-
ations. To measure the overhead incurred by redirecting file system operations, we
choose a benchmark app, AndroBench [6], which is designed for measuring storage
performance on Android devices. Besides the test benches included in AndroBench,
we added two more tests to measure the performance of creating and deleting files.
Each test bench is executed 10 times with Mask enabled and disabled. To evaluate
the overhead caused by intercepting IPCs, we use a synthesized benchmark which
contains two test benches, measuring the overheads incurred by IPCs filtering and
reformatting, respectively. IPC filtering differentiates the IPCs we are interested in,
such as getting device ID, from those we are not, such as getting location updates,
while IPC reformatting reconstructs a low-level binary sequence into high-level ob-
jects and modifies the corresponding persistent identifiers. The IPC filtering incurs
overhead to any IPC between an app and other parties, while the IPC reformatting
overhead is incurred only for those IPCs that return personal or device identifying
information to the app.
The results on application runtime overheads are summarized in Table 4.4. The
performance degradation on file system operations is minor because the only over-
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head incurred is for transforming the paths in the app’s original storage to the paths
in the sandbox’s shadow storage. This transformation is much lighter-weighted com-
pared to file system IOs. We also found the IPC filtering overhead to be negligible,
meaning that Mask does not affect the performance of most ‘uninteresting’ IPC calls.
By contrast, the IPC reformatting overhead is significant (more than 37%) because
parsing byte array into high-level objects, for example java objects, is expensive.
However, since we only reformat a very small portion of all the IPCs—only those
return persistent identifiers—the overall performance degradation is found negligible.
4.4.5 Applicability
Mask applies different private execution modes for mobile applications with differ-
ent usage patterns (exclusive, durative or stateless). Here, we case studied the top
200 free apps in Google Play and study how many of them can be used with Mask.
We assume a privacy-aware user who always selects the usage pattern that delivers
the highest privacy level without compromising the major functionality of the app.
We classify the apps according to the usage patterns and further break down the
numbers into each functional category, as shown in Fig. 4.6. To sum up, 29% of the
apps can be used statelessly, 43% can be used duratively and 25% have to be used
exclusively. To note, Mask is only applicable to 97% of all the apps, excluding apps
designed for system usage, such as file explorer, anti-virus software, etc. Sandboxing
these apps fundamentally violates their functionalities and results in unpredictable
results or even crashes.
We also conducted a study on 27 mobile users who had neither prior knowledge
of the Mask project nor domain-specific expertise. The users are recruited by posting
surveys in our university library. Our findings are summarized as follows:
• 80% of the mobile users are aware that app developers or advertising libraries























































































































































































Figure 4.6: Breakdown of apps according to their usage patterns on a per-category basis
or serious privacy threat, 45% as a minor privacy threat while 15% of them are
not concerned with it at all.
• 60% of the mobile users believe maintaining multiple isolated profiles for the
same mobile app will provide better privacy protection. Of these people, more
than 70% are willing to take actions if theyre given such an option.
4.5 Related Work
There have been numerous studies on information access control on smartphones
[18, 31, 33, 49, 81]. They focus on detecting and defending illegitimate collection of
sensitive user information, by malicious mobile apps or third parties. Orthogonal to
these studies, Mask focuses on unregulated aggregation of sensitive user information,
irrespective of how it is collected. There also exist other efforts on the issue of
information aggregation in the mobile ecosystem [40, 45, 86, 95, 98]. Most of them only
target a restricted scenario — advertising agencies — and assume mobile apps are
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trustworthy. Different from these works, Mask considers a more general and realistic
scenario and and breaks unregulated aggregation by both mobile apps, advertising
agencies and network sniffers. Linkdroid [40] tries to solve a similar problem but
requires extensive modifications on the smartphone OS. Mask, instead, utilize the
usage patterns of apps and strikes a useful trade-off by delivering private execution
modes in the user-level.
MoRePriv [29], πBox [60] also focused on resolving the conflict between privacy
and personalization of mobile apps. MoRePriv argued that personalization should be
provided by the OS instead of apps. Similarly in principle, πBox shifts the respon-
sibility of protecting privacy from the app and its users to the platform itself. By
contrast, Mask neither advocates a new ecosystem, nor requires modification to the
existing one. It provides a practically deployable design which allows end-users to
‘negotiate’ with the mobile app at the client side.
4.6 Conclusion
In the current mobile app ecosystem, app usages of a user are linkable by default.
This allows an interested/curious party to conduct unsolicited user profiling, targeted
advertising or public surveillance. In this chapter, we designed and implemented a
practical solution called Mask, allowing users to unlink app usages that are function-
ally independent of each other. Specifically, we introduce a set of private execution
modes and give users options to specify whether and within which scope his current
app session should be linkable. We presented the technical details and challenges of




Continuous Authentication for Voice Assistants
5.1 Introduction
Siri, Cortana, Google Now, and Alexa are becoming our everyday fixtures. Through
voice interactions, these and other voice assistants allow us to place phone calls,
send messages, check emails, schedule appointments, navigate to destinations, con-
trol smart appliances, and perform banking services. In numerous scenarios such
as cooking, exercising or driving, voice interaction is preferable to traditional touch
interfaces that are inconvenient or even dangerous to use. Furthermore, a voice inter-
face is even essential for the increasingly prevalent Internet of Things (IoT) devices
that lack touch capabilities [76].
With sound being an open channel, voice as an input mechanism is inherently
insecure as it is prone to replay, sensitive to noise, and easy to impersonate. Exist-
ing voice authentication mechanisms, such as Google’s “Trusted Voice” and Nuance’s
“FreeSpeech” used by banks,1 fail to provide the security features for voice assistant
systems. An adversary can bypass these voice-as-biometric authentication mecha-
nisms by impersonating the user’s voice or simply launching a replay attack. Recent




mangled voice [19, 104], wireless signals [55], or through public radio stations [72] with-
out raising the user’s attention. Even Google warns against its voice authentication
feature as being insecure,2 and some security companies [14] recommend relinquish-
ing voice interfaces all together until security issues are resolved. The implications of
attacking voice-assistant systems can be severe, ranging from information theft and
financial loss [71] all the way to inflicting physical harm via unauthorized access to
smart appliances and vehicles.
In this chapter, we propose VAuth, a novel system that provides usable and con-
tinuous authentication for voice assistant systems. As a wearable security token, it
supports on-going authentication by matching the user’s voice with an additional
channel that provides physical assurance. VAuth collects the body-surface vibrations
of a user via an accelerometer and continuously matches them to the voice commands
received by the voice assistant. This way, VAuth guarantees that the voice assistant
executes only the commands that originate from the voice of the owner. VAuth offers
the following salient features.
Continuous Authentication VAuth specifically addresses the problem of continu-
ous authentication of a speaker to a voice-enabled device. Most authentication mech-
anisms, including all smartphone-specific ones such as passwords, PINs, patterns,
and fingerprints, provide security by proving the user’s identity before establishing a
session. They hinge on one underlying assumption: the user retains exclusive control
of the device right after the authentication. While such an assumption is natural for
touch interfaces, it is unrealistic for the case of voice assistants. Voice allows access for
any third party during a communication session, rendering pre-session authentication
insufficient. VAuth provides ongoing speaker authentication during an entire session
2When a user tries to enable Trusted Voice on Nexus devices, Google explicitly warns
that it is less secure than password and can be exploited by the attacker with a very similar
voice.
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by ensuring that every speech sample recorded by the voice assistant originates from
the speaker’s throat. Thus, VAuth complements existing mechanisms of initial session
authentication and speaker recognition.
Improved Security Features Existing biometric-based authentication approaches
tries to reduce time-domain signals to a set of vocal features. Regardless of how de-
scriptive the features are of the speech signal, they still represent a projection of
the signal to a reduced-dimension space. Therefore, collisions are bound to happen;
two different signals can result in the same feature vector. For example, Tavish et
al. [104] fabricated mangled voice segments, incomprehensible to a human, but map
to the same feature vector as a voice command so that they are recognizable by a
voice assistant. Such attacks weaken the security guarantees provided by almost all
voice-biometric approaches [85].
In contrast, VAuth utilizes an instantaneous matching algorithm to compare the
entire signal from accelerometer with that of microphone in the time domain. VAuth
splits both accelerometer and microphone signals into speech segments and proceeds
to match both signals one segment at a time. It filters the non-matching segments
from the microphone signal and only passes the matching ones to the voice assis-
tant. Our theoretical analysis of VAuth’s matching algorithm (section 5.8) demon-
strates that it prevents an attacker from injecting any command even when the user is
speaking. Moreover, VAuth overcomes the security problems of leaked or stolen voice
biometric information, such as voiceprints. A voice biometric is a lifetime property
of an individual, and leaking it renders voice authentication insecure. On the other
hand, when losing VAuth for any reason, the user has to just unpair the token and
pair a new one.
Usability A user can use VAuth out-of-the-box as it does not require any user-
specific training, a drastic departure from existing voice biometric mechanisms. It
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only depends on the instantaneous consistency between the accelerometer and mi-
crophone signals; therefore, it is immune to voice changes over time and in different
situations, such as sickness or tiredness. VAuth provides its security features as long
as it touches the user’s skin at any position on the facial, throat, and sternum3 ar-
eas. This allows us to incorporate VAuth into wearables that people are already using
on a daily basis, such as eyeglasses, Bluetooth earbuds and necklaces/lockets. Our
usability survey of 952 individuals revealed that users are willing to accept the differ-
ent configurations of VAuth, especially when they are concerned about the security
threats and when VAuth comes in the forms of which they are already comfortable.
We have implemented a prototype of VAuth using a commodity accelerometer and
an off-the-shelf Bluetooth transmitter. Our implementation is built into the Google
Now system in Android, and could easily extend to other platforms such as Cortana,
Siri, or even phone banking services. To demonstrate the effectiveness of VAuth, we
recruited 18 participants and asked each of them to issue 30 different voice commands
using VAuth. We repeated the experiments for three wearable scenarios: eyeglasses,
earbuds and necklace. We found that VAuth:
• delivers almost perfect results with more than 97% detection accuracy and close
to 0 false positives. This indicates most of the commands are correctly authen-
ticated from the first trial and VAuth only matches the command that originates
from the owner;
• works out-of-the-box regardless of variation in accents, mobility patterns (still
vs. jogging), or even across languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, Korean, Per-
sian);
• effectively thwarts mangling voice attacks and successfully blocks unauthenti-
cated voice commands replayed by an attacker or impersonated by other users;
3The sternum is the bone that connects the rib cage; it vibrates as a result of the speech.
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and
• incurs negligible latency (an average of 300ms) and energy overhead (requiring
re-charging only once a week).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the related
work while Section 5.3 provides the necessary background of human speech models.
Section 5.4 states the system and threat models and Section 5.5 details the design
and implementation of VAuth. We discuss our matching algorithm in Section 5.6,
and conduct phonetic-level analysis on the matching algorithm in Section 5.7. We
further study the security properties of the matching algorithm in Section 5.8 using a
theoretical model. Section 5.9 evaluates VAuth’s effectiveness. Section 5.10 discusses
VAuth’s features. Finally, the chapter concludes with Section 5.11.
5.2 Related Work
Smartphone Voice Assistants Many researchers have studied the security issues
of smartphone voice assistants [30, 55, 88, 104]. They have also demonstrated the pos-
sibility of injecting commands into voice assistants with electromagnetic signals [55]
or with a mangled voice that is incomprehensible to humans [104]. These practical
attack scenarios motivate us to build an authentication scheme for voice assistants.
Petracca et al. [88] proposed a generic protection scheme for audio channels by track-
ing suspicious information flows. This solution prompts the user and requires manual
review for each potential voice command. It thus suffers from the habituation and
satisficing drawbacks since it interrupts the users from their primary tasks [38].
Voice Authentication Most voice authentication schemes involve training on the
user’s voice samples and building a voice biometric [12, 22, 28, 57]. The biometric may
depend on the user’s vocal features or cultural backgrounds and requires rigorous
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training to perform well. There is no theoretical guarantee that they provide good
security in general. Approaches in this category project the signal to a reduced-
dimension space and collisions are thus inherent. In fact, most companies adopt these
mechanisms for the usability benefits and claim they are not as secure as passwords
or patterns [78]. Moreover, for the particular case of voice assistants, they all are
subject to simple replay attacks.
Mobile Sensing Many researchers have studied the potential applications of ac-
celerometers for human behavior analysis [9, 70, 84, 111]. Studies show that it is pos-
sible to infer keyboard strokes [9], smartphone touch inputs [111] or passwords [9, 84]
from acceleration information. There are also applications utilizing the correlation
between sound and vibrations [62, 75] for health monitoring purposes. Doctors can
thus detect voice disorder without actually collecting the user’s daily conversations.
These studies are very different from ours which focuses on continuous voice assistant
security.
5.3 Background
We introduce some basic concepts and terminology regarding the generation and
processing of human speech, which will be referenced consistently throughout the
chapter.
5.3.1 Human Speech Model
The production of human speech is commonly modeled as the combined effect of
two separate processes [46]: a voice source (vibration of vocal folds) that generates
the original signal and a filter (determined by the resonant properties of vocal tract
including the influence of tongue and lips) that further modulates the signal. The


























Figure 5.1: The source–filter model of human speech production using the vowel {i:}
as an example.
specific phoneme (see Fig. 5.1b for the vowel {i:} – the vowel in the word “see”).
This process is widely used and referred to as the source-filter model.
Fig. 5.1a shows an example of a female speaker pronouncing the vowel {i:}. The
time separating each pair of peaks is the length of each glottal pulse (cycle). It also
refers to the instantaneous fundamental frequency (f0) variation while the user is
speaking, which is the pitch of speaker’s voice. The value of f0 varies between 80 to
333Hz for a human speaker. The glottal cycle length (being the inverse of the funda-
mental frequency) varies 0.003sec and 0.0125sec. As the human speaker pronounces
different phonemes in a particular word, the pitch changes accordingly, which becomes
an important feature of speaker recognition. We utilize the fundamental frequency
(f0) as a reference to filter signals that fall outside of the human speech range.
5.3.2 Speech Recognition and MFCC
The de facto standard and probably the most widely used feature for speech
recognition is Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [63], which models the way
humans perceive sounds. In particular, these features are computed on short-term
windows when the signal is assumed to be stationary. To compute the MFCCs, the
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speech recognition system computes the short-term Fourier transform of the signal,
then scales the frequency axis to the non-linear Mel scale (a set of Mel bands). Then,
the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is computed on the log of the power spectrum
of each Mel band. This technique works well in speech recognition because it tracks
the invariant feature of human speech across different users. However, it also opens
the door to potential attacks: by generating mangled voice segments with the same
MFCC feature, an attacker can trick the voice assistant into executing specific voice
commands without drawing any attention from the user.
5.4 System and Threat Models
5.4.1 System Model
VAuth consists of two components. The first is an accelerometer mounted on a
wearable device which can be placed on the user’s chest, around the neck or on the
facial area. The second component is an extended voice assistant that issues voice
commands after correlating and verifying both the accelerometer signal from the
wearable device and the microphone signal collected by the assistant. This system
is not only compatible with smartphone voice assistants such as Siri and Google
Now, but also applies to voice systems in other domains such as Amazon Alexa and
phone-based authentication system used by banks. We assume the communications
between the two components are encrypted. Attacks to this communication channel
are orthogonal to this work. We also assume the wearable device serves as a secure
token that the user will not share with others. The latter assumption is known as
security by possession, which is widely adopted in the security field in the form of
authentication rings [105], wristbands [68], or RSA SecurID. Thus, the problem of
authenticating the wearable token to the user is orthogonal to VAuth and has been
addressed elsewhere [23]. Instead, we focus on the problem of authenticating voice
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commands, assuming the existence of a trusted wearable device.
5.4.2 Threat Model
We consider an attacker who is interested in stealing private information or con-
ducting unauthorized operations by exploiting the voice assistant of the target user.
Typically, the attacker tries to hijack the voice assistant of the target user and de-
ceive it into executing mal-intended voice commands, such as sending text messages
to premium phone numbers or conducting bank transactions. The adversary mounts
the attack by interfering with the audio channel. This does not assume the attacker
has to be physically at the same location as the target. It can utilize equipment
that can generate a sound on its behalf, such as radio channels or high-gain speakers.
Specifically, we consider the following three categories of attack scenarios.
Scenario A – Stealthy Attack The attacker attempts to inject either inaudible
or incomprehensible voice commands through wireless signals [55] or mangled voice
commands [19, 104]. This attack is stealthy in the sense that the victim may not even
be aware of the on-going threat. It is also preferable to the attacker when the victim
has physical control or within close proximity of the voice assistant.
Scenario B – Biometric-override Attack The attacker attempts to inject voice
commands [85] by replaying a previously recorded clip of the victim’s voice, or by
impersonating the user’s voice. This attack can have a very low technical barrier:
we found that by simply mimicking the victim’s voice, an attacker can bypass the
Trusted Voice feature of Google Now within five trials, even when the attacker and
the victim are of different genders.
Scenario C – Acoustic Injection Attack The attacker can be more advanced,
trying to generate a voice that has a direct effect on the accelerometer [102]. The
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intention is to override VAuth’s verification channel with high energy vibrations. For
example, the attacker can play very loud music which contains embedded patterns of
voice commands.
5.5 VAuth
We now present the high-level design of VAuth, describe our prototype implemen-
tation with Google Now, and elaborate on its usability aspects.
5.5.1 High-Level Overview
VAuth has two components: (1) a wearable component, responsible for collecting
and uploading the accelerometer data, and (2) a voice assistant extension, responsible
for authenticating and launching the voice commands. The first component easily
incorporates into existing wearable products, such as earbuds/earphones/headsets,
eyeglasses, or necklaces/lockets. The usability aspect of VAuth will be discussed
later in this sectiontoken that the user does not share with others. When a user
triggers the voice assistant, for example by saying “OK, Google” or “Hey, Siri”, our
voice assistant extension will fetch accelerometer data from the wearable component,
correlate it with signals collected from microphone and issue the command only when
there is a match. Fig. 5.2 depicts the information flows in our system. To reduce the
processing burden on the user’s device, the matching does not take place on the device
(that runs the voice assistant), but rather at the server side. The communication
between the wearable component and the voice assistant takes place over Bluetooth
BR/EDR [15]. Bluetooth Classic is an attractive choice as a communication channel,
since it has a relatively high data rate (up to 2Mbps), is energy-efficient, and enables
secure communication through its pairing procedure.
The design of VAuth is modular and compatible with most voice assistant sys-
tems. One can thus customize any component in Fig. 5.2 to optimize functionality,
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Figure 5.2: The high-level design of VAuth, consisting of the wearable and the voice
assistant extension.
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(a) Wireless (b) Eyeglasses
Figure 5.3: Our prototype of VAuth, featuring the accelerometer chip and Bluetooth
transmitter, (a) compared to US quarter coin and (b) attached to a pair of eyeglasses
belonging to one of the authors.
performance or usability. Here, we elaborate how to integrate this into an existing
voice assistant, using Google Now as an example.
5.5.2 Prototype
We first elaborate on our design of the wearable component. We use a Knowles
BU-27135 miniature accelerometer with the dimension of only 7.92×5.59×2.28mm
so that it can easily fit in any wearable design. The accelerometer uses only the
z-axis and has an analog bandwidth of 11kHz, enough to capture the bandwidth of
a speech signal. We utilize an external Bluetooth transmitter that provides Analog-
to-Digital Conversion (ADC) and Bluetooth transmission capabilities to the voice
assistant extension. To reduce energy consumption, BinderCrackerstarts streaming
the accelerometer signal only upon request from the voice assistant. Our prototype
communicates the microphone and accelerometer signals to a Matlab-based server
which performs the matching and returns the result to the voice assistant. Fig. 5.3
depicts our wireless prototype standalone, and attached to a pair of eyeglasses.
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Our system is integrated with Google Now voice assistant to enable voice command
authentication. VAuth starts execution immediately after the start of a voice session
(right after “OK Google” is recognized). It blocks the voice assistant’s command
execution after the voice session ends until the matching result becomes available. If
the matching fails, VAuth kills the voice session. To achieve its functionality, VAuth
intercepts both the HotwordDetector and the QueryEngine to establish the required
control flow.
Our voice assistant extension is implemented as a standalone user-level service.
It is responsible for retrieving accelerometer signals from the wearable device, and
sending both accelerometer and microphone to our Matlab-based server for analysis.
The user-level service provides two RPC methods, start and end, which are triggered
by the events generated when the hotword “OK Google” is detected, and when the
query (command) gets executed, respectively. The first event can be observed by
filtering the Android system logs, and we intercept the second by overriding the
Android IPC mechanisms, by filtering the Intents sent by Google Now. Also, since
some Android devices (e.g., Nexus 5) do not allow two apps to access the microphone
at the same time, we need to stream the voice signal retrieved by the voice assistant
to our user-level service. We solve this by intercepting the read method in the
AudioRecord class. Whenever Google Now gets the updated voice data through this
interface, it will forward a copy of the data to our user-level service via another RPC
method.
Note that the modifications and interceptions above are necessary only because
we have no access to the Google Now source. The incorporation of VAuth is straight-
forward in the cases when developers try to build/extend their voice assistant.
5.5.3 Usability
VAuth requires the user to wear a security-assisting device. There are two gen-
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(a) Earbuds (b) Eyeglasses (c) Necklace
Figure 5.4: The wearable scenarios supported by VAuth.
eral ways to meet this requirement. The first is to ask users to wear an additional
device for security, while the other is to embed VAuth in existing wearable products
that the users are already comfortable with in their daily lives. We opted for the
latter as security has always been a secondary concern for users [107]. Our prototype
supports three widely-adopted wearable scenarios: earbuds/earphones/headsets, eye-
glasses, and necklace/lockets. Fig. 5.4 shows the positions of the accelerometer in
each scenario. We select these areas because they have consistent contact with the
user’s body. While VAuth performs well on all facial areas, shoulders and the sternal
surface, we only focus on the three positions shown in Fig. 5.4 since they conform
with widely-adopted wearables.
We have conducted a usability survey to study the users’ acceptance of the differ-
ent configurations of VAuth. We surveyed 952 individuals using Amazon Mechanical
Turk. We restricted the respondent pool to those from the US with previous expe-
rience with voice assistants. We compensated each respondent with $0.5 for their
participation. Of the respondents, 40% are female, 60% are employed full-time, and
67% have an education level of associate degree or above. Our respondents primarily
use voice assistants for information search (70%), navigation (54%), and communica-
tion (47%). More than half (58%) of them reported using a voice assistant at least
once a week.
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Survey Design: We follow the USE questionnaire methodology [64] to measure
the usability aspects of VAuth. We use a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree) to assess the user’s satisfaction with a certain aspect
or configuration of VAuth. We pose the questions in the form of how much the
respondent agrees with a certain statement, such as: I am willing to wear a necklace
that contains the voice assistant securing technology. Below, we report a favorable
result as the portion of respondents who answered a question with a score higher than
4 (5,6,7) on the 7-point scale. Next to each result, we report the portion of those
surveyed, between brackets, who answered the question with a score higher than 5 (6
or 7).
The survey consists of three main parts that include: demographics and experience
with voice assistants, awareness of the security issues, and the perception towards
VAuth. In Section 5.9, we will report more on the other usability aspects of VAuth,
such as matching accuracy, energy, and latency.
Security Awareness: We first asked the respondents about their opinion regard-
ing the security of voice assistants. Initially, 86% (63%) of the respondents indicate
that they think the voice assistants are secure. We then primed the respondents about
the security risks associated with voice assistants by iterating the attacks presented in
Section 5.4. Our purpose was to study the perception of using VAuth from individuals
who are already aware of the security problems of voice assistants.
After the priming, the respondents’ perceptions shifted considerably. 71% (51%) of
the respondents indicate that attacks to voice assistants are dangerous, and 75%(52%)
specified that they would take steps to mitigate the threats. Almost all of the latter
belong to the set of respondents who now regard these attacks as dangerous to them.
Wearability: In the last part of the survey, we ask the participants about their
preferences for wearing VAuth in any of the three configurations of Fig. 5.4. We have
the following takeaways from the analysis of survey responses.
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Figure 5.5: A breakdown of respondents’ wearability preference by security concern
and daily wearables. Dangerous and Safe refer to participants’ attitudes towards the
attacks to voice assistants after they’ve been informed; the Dangerous category is
further split according to the wearables that people are already wearing on a daily
basis; Yes and No refer to whether participants are willing to use VAuth in at least
one of three settings we provided.
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• 70%(47%) of the participants are willing to wear at least one of VAuth’s config-
urations to provide security protection. These respondents are the majority of
those who are strongly concerned about the security threats.
• 48% (29%) of the respondents favored the earbuds/earphone/headset option,
38% (23%) favored the eyeglasses option and 35% (19%) favored the neck-
lace/locket option. As expected, the findings fit the respondents’ wearables in
their daily lives. 71% of the respondents who wear earbuds on a daily basis
favored that option for VAuth, 60% for eyeglasses and 63% for the necklace
option.
• There is no discrepancy in the wearable options among both genders. The gen-
der distribution of each wearable option followed the same gender distribution
of the whole respondent set.
• More than 75% of the users are willing to pay $10 more for a wearable equipped
with this technology while more than half are willing to pay $25 more.
• Respondents were concerned about the battery life of VAuth. A majority of
73% (81%) can accommodate charging once a week, 60% (75%) can accommo-
date once per 5 days, and 38% (58%) can accommodate once each three days.
In Section 5.9, we show that the energy consumption of VAuth matches the
respondents’ requirements.
Fig. 5.5 presents a breakdown of the major findings in our usability survey. These
results demonstrate that users are willing to accept the different configurations of
VAuth, especially when they are concerned about the privacy/security threats and











































Figure 5.6: Pre-processing stage of VAuth’s matching.
5.6 Matching Algorithm
The matching algorithm of VAuth (highlighted in Fig. 5.2) takes as input the
speech and vibration signals along with their corresponding sampling frequencies. It
outputs a decision value indicating whether there is a match between the two signals
as well as a “cleaned” speech signal in case of a match. VAuth performs the matching
in three stages: pre-processing, speech segments analysis, and matching decision.
In what follows, we elaborate on VAuth’s matching algorithm using a running
example of a male speaker recording the two words: “cup” and “luck” with a short
pause between them. The speech signal is sampled by an accelerometer from the
lowest point on the sternum at 64kHz and recorded from a built-in laptop microphone
at a sampling frequency of 44.1kHz, 50cm away from the speaker.
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5.6.1 Pre-processing
First, VAuth applies a highpass filter, with cutoff frequency at 100 Hz, to the
accelerometer signal. The filter removes all the artifacts of the low-frequency user
movement to the accelerometer signal (such as walking or breathing). We use 100Hz
as a cutoff threshold because humans cannot generate more than 100 mechanical
movements per second. VAuth then re-samples both accelerometer and microphone
signals to the same sampling rate while applying a low-pass filter at 4kHz to prevent
aliasing. We choose a sampling rate of 8kHz that preserves most acoustic features of
the speech signal and reduces the processing load. Thus, VAuth requires an accelerom-
eter of bandwidth larger than 4kHz. Then VAuth applies Fig. 5.6a shows both raw
signals immediately after both signals are filtered and resampled. As evident from the
figure, the accelerometer signal has a high-energy spike due to the sudden movement
of the accelerometer (e.g., rubbing against the skin), and small energy components
resulting from speech vibrations. On the other hand, the speech signal has two high-
energy segments along with other lower-energy segments corresponding to background
noise.
Second, VAuth normalizes the magnitude of both signals to have a maximum
magnitude of unity, which necessitates removal of the spikes in the signals. Otherwise,
the lower-energy components referring to the actual speech will not be recovered. The
matching algorithm computes a running average of the signal’s energy and enforces a
cut-off threshold, keeping only the signals with energy level within the moving average
plus six standard deviation levels.
After normalizing the signal magnitude, as shown in the top plot of Fig. 5.6b,
VAuth aligns both signals by finding the time shift that results in the maximum
cross correlation of both signals. Then, it truncates both signals to make them have
the same length. Note that VAuth does not utilize more sophisticated alignment algo-
rithms such as Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), since they remove timing information
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critical to the signal’s pitch and they also require a higher processing load. Fig. 5.6b
shows both accelerometer and microphone signals aligned and normalized.
The next pre-processing step includes identification of the energy envelope of
the accelerometer signal and then its application to the microphone signal. VAuth
identifies the parts of the signal that have a significant signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
These are the “bumps” of the signal’s energy as shown in the top plot of Fig. 5.6b.
The energy envelope of the signal is a quantification of the signal’s energy between
0 and 1. In particular, the portions of the signal with average energy exceeding 5%
of maximum signal energy map to 1, and other segments map to 0. This results in
four energy segments of the accelerometer signal of Fig. 5.6b. The thresholds for
energy detection depend on the average noise level (due to ADC chip’s sampling and
quantization) when the user is silent. We chose these thresholds after studying our
wireless prototype’s Bluetooth transmitter.
Finally, VAuth applies the accelerometer envelope to the microphone signal so
that it removes all parts from the microphone signal that did not result from body
vibrations, as shown in the bottom plot of Fig. 5.6b. This is the first real step
towards providing the security guarantees. In most cases, it avoids attacks on voice
assistant systems when the user is not actively speaking. Inadvertently, it improves
the accuracy of the voice recognition by removing background noise and sounds from
the speech signals that could not have been generated by the user.
5.6.2 Per-Segment Analysis
Once it identifies high-energy segments of the accelerometer signal, VAuth starts
a segment-by-segment matching. Fig. 5.6b shows four segments corresponding to the
parts of the signal where the envelope is equal to 1.
For each segment, VAuth normalizes the signal magnitude to unity to remove the


























(b) matching segment s4
Figure 5.7: Per-segment analysis stage of VAuth.
serves to make the energy content of each segment uniform, which will elaborate on
later in Section 5.8. VAuth then applies the approach of Boersma [16] to extract
the glottal cycles from each segment. The approach relies on the identification of
periodic patterns in the signal as the local maxima of the auto-correlation function of
the signal. Thus, each segment is associated with a series of glottal pulses as shown
in Fig. 5.7. VAuth uses information about the segment and the corresponding glottal
pulses to filter out the segments that do not correspond to human speech and those
that do not match between the accelerometer and microphone signals as follows.
1. If the length of the segment is less than 20ms, the length of a single phoneme,
then VAuth removes the segment from both accelerometer and microphone sig-
nals. Such segments might arise from sudden noise.
2. If the segment has no identifiable glottal pulses or the length of the longest con-
tinuous sequence of glottal pulses is less than 20ms (the duration to pronounce
a single phoneme), then VAuth also removes the segment. Fig. 5.7a shows the
segment “s1” at a higher resolution. It only contains five pulses which could
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not have resulted from a speech.
3. If the average glottal cycle of the accelerometer segment is larger than 0.003sec
or smaller than 0.0125sec, then VAuth removes the segment from both signals.
This refers to the case of the fundamental frequency falling outside the range
of [80Hz, 333 Hz] which corresponds to the human speech range.
4. If the average relative distance between glottal pulse sequence between the
accelerometer and microphone segments is higher than 25%, then VAuth removes
the segment from both signals. This refers to the case of interfered speech
(e.g., attacker trying to inject speech); the instantaneous pitch variations should
be similar between the accelerometer and microphone [74] in the absence of
external interference. For example, it is evident that the pitch information is
very different between the accelerometer and microphone of Fig. 5.7a.
After performing all the above filtering steps, VAuth does a final verification step
by running a normalized cross correlation between the accelerometer and microphone
segments. If the maximum correlation coefficient falls inside the range [-0.25,0.25],
then the segments are discarded. We use this range as a conservative way of specifying
that the segments do not match (correlation coefficient close to zero). The correla-
tion is a costlier operation but is a known metric for signal similarity that takes into
consideration all the information of the time-domain signals. For example, the seg-
ment “s4” depicted in Fig. 5.7b shows matching pitch information and a maximum
cross-correlation coefficient of 0.52.
5.6.3 Matching Decision
After the segment-based analysis finishes, only the “surviving” segments comprise
the final accelerometer and microphone signals. In Fig. 5.8a, only the segments “s2”

































Figure 5.8: Matching decision stage of VAuth’s matching.
plot that the microphone signal has two significant components referring to each word.
The final step is to produce a matching decision. VAuth measures the similarity
between the two signals by using the normalized cross-correlation, as shown in the
top plot of Fig. 5.8b. VAuth cannot just perform the cross-correlation on the input
signals before cleaning. Before cleaning the signal, the cross-correlation results do
not have any real indication of signal similarity. Consider the lower plot of Fig. 5.8b,
which corresponds to the cross-correlation performed on the original input signals
of Fig. 5.6a. As evident from the plot, the cross-correlation shows absolutely no
similarity between the two signals, even though they describe the same speech sample.
Instead of manually constructing rules that map the cross-correlation vector to
a matching or non-matching decision, we opted to utilize a machine learning-based
classifier to increase the accuracy of VAuth’s matching. Below, we elaborate on the
three components of VAuth’s classifier: the feature set, the machine learning algorithm
and the training set.
119
Feature Set In general, the feature vector comprises the normalized cross-correlation
values (h(t)) of the final accelerometer and microphone signals. However, we need to
ensure that the structure of the feature vector is uniform across all matching tasks.
To populate the feature vector, we identify the maximum value of h(t), and then
uniformly sample 500 points to the left and another 500 to the right of the maximum.
We end up with a feature vector containing 1001 values, centered at the maximum
value of the normalized cross-correlation.
Formally, if the length of h(t) is te, let tm = arg max
t
|h(t)|. Then, the left part
of the feature vector is hl[n] = h(
n.tm
500
), 1 < n < 500. The right part of the feature
vector is hr[n] = h(tm +
n.(te−tm)
500
), 1 < n < 500. The final feature vector can then be
given as h[n] = hl[n] + h(tm).δ[n− 501] + hr[n− 502].
Classifier We opted to use SVM as the classifier thanks to its ability to deduce
linear relations between the cross-correlation values that define the feature vector.
We utilize Weka [44] to train an SVM using the Sequential Minimal Optimization
(SMO) algorithm [89]. The SMO algorithm uses a logistic calibrator with neither
standardization nor normalization to train the SVM. The SVM utilizes a polynomial
kernel with the degree equal to 1. We use the trained model in our prototype to
perform the online classification.
Training Set Here, it is critical to specify that our training set has been generated
offline and is user-agnostic; we performed the training only once. We recorded (more
on that in Section 5.7) all 44 English phonemes (24 vowels and 20 consonants) from
one of the authors at the lower sternum position using both the accelerometer and
microphone. Hence, we have 44 accelerometer (acc(i)) and microphone (mic(i)) pair
of recordings corresponding for each English phoneme. To generate the training set,
we ran VAuth’s matching over all 44 × 44 accelerometer and microphone recordings
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to generate 1936 initial feature vectors, (fv), and their labels as follows:
∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 44; ∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ 44;
fv[j + 44(i− 1)] = match(acc(i),mic(j))
label[j + 44(i− 1)] = 1i=j.
The generated training dataset contains only 44 vectors with positive labels. This
might bias the training process towards the majority class (label = 0). To counter
this effect, we amplified the minority class by replicating the vectors with positive
labels five times. The final training set contains 236 vectors with positive labels and
1892 vectors with negative labels. We use this training set to train the SVM, which,
in turn, performs the online classification.
VAuth’s classifier is trained offline, only once and only using a single training set.
The classifier is thus agnostic of the user, position on the body and language. In
our user study and rest of the evaluation of Section 5.9, this (same) classifier is used
to perform all the matching. To use VAuth, the user need not perform any initial
training.
After computing the matching result, VAuth passes the final (cleaned and normal-
ized) microphone signal to the voice assistant system to execute the speech recognition
and other functionality.
5.7 Phonetic-Level Analysis
We evaluate the effectiveness of our matching algorithm on phonetic-level match-
ings/authentications. The International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) standardizes the
representation of sounds of oral languages based on the Latin alphabet. While the
number of words in a language, and therefore the sentences, can be uncountable,
the number of phonemes in the English language are limited to 44 vowels and con-
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sonants. By definition, any English word or sentence, as spoken by a human, is
necessarily a combination of those phonemes [61]; A phoneme4 represents the small-
est unit of perceptual sound. Our phonetic-level evaluation represents a baseline of
VAuth’s operation. Table 5.1 lists 20 vowels and 24 consonants p honemes, with two
words representing examples of where the phonemes appear.





2 CUP, LUCK b BAD, LAB
A: ARM, FATHER d DID, LADY
æ CAT, BLACK f FIND, IF
e MET, BED g GIVE, FLAG
@ AWAY, CINEMA h HOW, HELLO
3:r TURN, LEARN j YES, YELLOW
I HIT, SITTING k CAT, BACK
i: SEE, HEAT l LEG, LITTLE
6 HOT, ROCK m MAN, LEMON
O: CALL, FOUR n NO, TEN
U PUT, COULD N SING, FINGER
u: BLUE, FOOD p PET, MAP
AI FIVE, EYE r RED, TRY
AU NOW, OUT s SUN, MISS
eI SAY, EIGHT S SHE, CRASH
oU GO, HOME t TEA, GETTING
OI BOY, JOIN úS
CHECK,
CHURCH
e@r WHERE, AIR T THINK, BOTH














- - ãZ JUST, LARGE
We study if VAuth can correctly match the English phoneme between the ac-
celerometer and microphone (true positives), and whether it mistakenly matches
phoneme samples from accelerometer to other phoneme samples from the microphone
(false positives).
We recruited two speakers, a male and a female, to record the 44 examples listed
in Table 5.1. Each example comprises two words, separated by a brief pause, both
representing a particular phoneme. We asked the speaker to say both words, not just
the phoneme, as it is easier for the speaker to pronounce the phoneme in the context



























































(b) ASR accuracy for accelerometer signal
Figure 5.9: Analysis of the vibrations received by the accelerometer.
workstation laptop. At the same time, both speakers were wearing VAuth, with the
accelerometer taped to the sternum. The microphone was sampled at 44100 Hz, and
the accelerometer at 64000 Hz.
5.7.1 Accelerometer Energy & Recognition
Phonemes originate from a possibly different part of the chest-mouth-nasal area.
In what follows, we show that each phoneme results in vibrations that the accelerom-
eter chip of VAuth can register, but does not retain enough acoustic features to sub-
stitute a microphone speech signal for the purpose of voice recognition. This explains
our rationale for employing the matching-based approach.
We perform the pre-processing stage of VAuth’s matching algorithm to clean both
accelerometer and microphone signals for each phoneme. After normalizing both
signals to a unity magnitude, we compute the accelerometer signal’s energy relative
to that of the microphone. Fig. 5.9a depicts the average relative energy of the vowel
and consonants phonemes for both the female and male speakers.
All phonemes register vibrations, with the minimum relative energy (14%) coming
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from the OI (the pronunciation of “oy” in “boy”) phoneme of the male speaker. It is
also clear from the figure that there is a low discrepancy of average relative energy
between vowels and consonants for the same speaker. Nevertheless, we notice a higher
discrepancy between the two speakers for the same phoneme. The female speaker has
a shorter distance between the larynx and lowest point of the sternum, and she has a
lower body fat ratio so that the chest skin is closer to the sternum bone. It is worth
noting that the energy reported in the figure does not represent the energy at the
time of the recording but after the initial processing and normalization. This explains
why in some cases the accelerometer energy exceeds that of the microphone.
While the accelerometer chip senses considerable energy from the chest vibrations,
it cannot substitute for the microphone. To confirm this, we passed the recorded
and cleaned accelerometer samples of all phonemes for both speakers to the Nuance
Automatic Speaker Recognition (ASR) API [82]. Fig. 5.9b shows the breakdown
of voice recognition accuracy for the accelerometer samples by phoneme type and
speaker. Clearly, a state-of-the-art ASR engine fails to identify the actual spoken
words. In particular, for about half of the phonemes for both speakers, the ASR fails
to return any result. Nuance API returns three suggestions for each accelerometer
sample for the rest of the phonemes. These results do not match any of the spoken
words. In only three cases for consonants phonemes for both speakers, the API returns
a result that matches at least one of the spoken words.
The above indicates that existing ASR engines cannot interpret the often low-
fidelity accelerometer samples, but it does not indicate that ASR engines cannot be
retrofitted to recognize samples with higher accuracy. This will, however, require
significant changes to deploying and training these systems. On the other hand,
VAuth is an entirely client-side solution that requires no changes to the ASR engine
or the voice assistant system.
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Table 5.2: The detection accuracy of VAuth for the English phonemes.
microphone accelerometer TP (%) FP (%)
consonants consonants 90 0.2
consonants vowels - 1.0
vowels consonants - 0.2
vowels vowels 100 1.7
























(b) High energy and periodic noise
Figure 5.10: Examples of tested noise signals.
5.7.2 Phonemes Detection Accuracy
We then evaluate the accuracy of detecting each phoneme for each speaker as well
as the false positive across phonemes and speakers. In particular, we run VAuth to
match each accelerometer sample (88 samples — corresponding to each phoneme and
speaker) to all the collected microphone samples; each accelerometer sample must
match only one microphone sample. Table 5.2 shows the matching results.
First, we match the consonant phonemes across the two speakers as evident in the
first row. The true positive rate exceeds 90%, showing that VAuth can correctly match
the vast majority of consonant phonemes. This is analogous to a low false negative
rate of less than 10%. Moreover, we report the false positive rate which indicates
the instances where VAuth matches an accelerometer sample to the inappropriate
microphone sample. As shown in the same figure, the false positive rate is nearly
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zero.
Having such a very low false positive rate highlights two security guarantees that
VAuth offers. It does not mistake a phoneme as another even for the same speaker. Re-
call that pitch information is widely used to perform speaker recognition, as each per-
son has unique pitch characteristics that are independent of the speech. VAuth over-
comes pitch characteristics similarity and is able to distinguish the different phonemes
as spoken by the same speaker.
Moreover, VAuth successfully distinguishes the same phoneme across the two
speakers. A phoneme contains speaker-independent features. VAuth overcomes these
similar features to effectively identify each of them for each speaker. The fourth row
of Table 5.2 shows comparable results when attempting to match the vowel phonemes
for both speakers.
The second and third rows complete the picture of phoneme matching. They show
the matching results of the vowel phonemes to the consonant phonemes for both
speakers. Both rows do not contain true positive values as there are no phoneme
matches. Nevertheless, one must notice the very low false positive ratio that confirms
the earlier observations. Finally, the fifth row shows results of matching all the
accelerometer samples to all the microphone samples. The true positive rate is 93%,
meaning that VAuth correctly matched 82 accelerometer samples matched to their
microphone counterparts. Moreover, the false positive rate was only 0.6%.
5.7.3 Idle Detection Accuracy
Last but not least, we evaluate another notion of false positives: VAuth mistak-
enly matches external speech to a silent user. We record idle (the user not actively
speaking) segments from VAuth’s accelerometer and attempt to match them to the
recorded phonemes of both participants. We considered two types of idle segments:
the first contains no energy from speech or other movements (Fig. 5.10a), while the
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other contains significant abrupt motion of the accelerometer resulting in recordings
with high energy spikes (similar to the spike of Fig. 5.6a). We also constructed a high
energy noise signal with periodic patterns as shown in Fig. 5.10b.
We execute VAuth over the different idle segments and microphone samples and
recorded the false matching decisions. In all of the experiments, we did not observe
any occurrence of a false matching of an idle accelerometer signal to any phoneme
from the microphone for both speakers. As recorded phonemes are representative of
all possible sounds comprising the English language, we can be confident that the
false positive rate of VAuth is zero in practice for silent users.
5.8 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we highlight the effectiveness of the per-segment analysis of VAuth’s
matching algorithm in preventing an attacker from injecting commands. We also show
that our matching algorithm ensures the phonetic-level results constitute a lower-
bound of sentence-level matching. We provide a formal analysis of this property,
which will be further supported in the next section using real user studies.
5.8.1 Model
We analyze the properties of VAuth’s matching algorithm which takes as inputs two
signals f(t) and g(t) originating from the accelerometer and microphone, respectively.
It outputs a final matching result that is a function of normalized cross-correlation
of f(t) and g(t): h(t) = f(t)?g(t)
E
, where E =
√
‖f(t)‖.‖g(t)‖, ? denotes the cross-
correlation operator, and ‖· ‖ is the energy of the signal (autocorrelation evaluated
at 0). For the simplicity of the analysis, we will focus on the most important feature





v = 0, if 0 ≤ m = max(|h(t)|) ≤ th
v = 1, if th < m = max(|h(t)|) ≤ 1.
(5.1)
Each of the input signals comprises a set of segments, which could refer to the
phonemes making up a word or words making up a sentence, depending on the
granularity of the analysis. Let fi(t) and gi(t) be the i
th segments of f(t) and
g(t), respectively. We assume that maximum length of a segment is τ , such that
fi(t) = 0, t ∈ (−∞, 0]
⋃
[τ,+∞). We can then rewrite f(t) as f(t) =
∑n
i=1 fi(t− iτ);
the same applies for g(t).
One can view the cross-correlation operation as sliding the segments gi(t) of g(t)
against those of f(t). The cross correlation of g(t) and f(t) can be computed as:


















(fn−i+j ? gj(t− (2n− i− 1)τ))
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i=1 gi(t− iτ)‖. Since the segments of f and g do not over-
lap each other (by their definition), the energy of a signal is the sum of the energies




i=1 ‖gi(t‖). Finally, we expand E







To decide on the final outcome, VAuth computes max |h(t)|, which, according to
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the triangle rule, becomes:





We assume that the segments’ cross-correlation maximizes when they are aligned.
That is, max(fi ? gj) =
τ∑
t=0
fi(t)gi(t); otherwise, we can redefine the segments to
adhere to this property. We can then separate the components of Eq. (5.3) into
different components such as:
(5.4)




















The above equation describes how the final outcome is related to the results of
running VAuth on the segments comprising f(t) and g(t). Two segments fi(t) and
gj(t) are positively matched when their maximum of normalized cross correlation,
mij, is between th and 1. Otherwise, there is a negative match.





Let ei,j denote the product of the energies of fi and gj, such that ei,j = ‖fi(t)‖.‖gj(t)‖.





















It is evident from Eq. (5.6) how the final outcome of VAuth depends on computing




the weighted average of the outcomes of VAuth when it matches the included segments.













where mij are as defined in Eq. (5.5); m11 and e11 are the results of matching f1 and
g2, m12 and e12 are those of f1 and g1, m21 and e21 are those of f2 and g2, and m22
and e22 are those of f2 and g1.
Given the above model of the final outcome of VAuth as a function of the segments
composing the commands, we study the properties of VAuth as described below.
5.8.2 Per-segment Analysis
Eq. (5.7) reveals the importance of the per-segment analysis of VAuth. This step
thwarts an attacker’s ability to inject commands into the voice assistant system. The
attacker aims to inject segments to g(t) that do not bring m below th (so that VAuth
generates a positive match according to Eq. (5.1)). If there were no per-segment
analysis, an attacker could exploit matching segments to inject segments that do
not match. The middle component of Eq. (5.7) explains it. Assuming that m1,2.e1,2
is large enough, the attacker can inject g2(t) such that m1,2.e1,2 + m2,1.e2,1 is still
large, despite m2,1 being low. This happens when e2,1 is too low, implying that the
accelerometer did not record the injected segment.
The per-segment analysis of VAuth addresses this issue using three mechanisms.
First, it removes all portions of f(t) that fall below the running average of the noise
level. These removed portions will not even be part of Eq. (5.7). So, the attacker can-
not inject commands when the user is silent (no corresponding accelerometer signal).
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Second, if the energy of some segment of f(t) is above the noise level, VAuth normalizes
its magnitude to 1, after removing the spikes. As such, it aims to make the energies
of the segments of f(t) uniform. The attacker cannot inject a command with very low
energy as it will not be recorded by the microphone of the voice assistant. This forces
e2,1 to be comparable to e1,2. As a result, a low value of m2,1 reduces the value of m
of Eq. (5.7).Third, and more importantly, The per-segment analysis of VAuth nullifies
those segments which have their maximum normalized cross-correlation falling below
a threshold (equal to 0.4 in our evaluation). These segments will not make it to the
final decision stage, and will not be part of Eq. (5.7).
5.8.3 False Positive Rate
The results of Section 5.7 show that the false positive rate of matching is not zero
for the English phonemes. Such a false positive rate opens up security holes in VAuth.
We show below that while the false positive rate is not zero at the phonetic level,
adding more phonemes to the command will drive the false positive rate closer to
zero. In other words, the more sounds the user speaks (i.e., the longer the command
is), the lower the false positive rate will be.
To show this, we will take another look at Eq. (5.6), where fi and gi represent
the phonemes making up the command. At the phonetic level, a false positive event
occurs when mi,j > th, given that fi does not match gj. As evident from Eq. (5.6),
when the values of ei,j are roughly uniform which we ensure from the per-segment
analysis, the value of m is simply an average of the values of mi,j. The final matching
result v(f, g), is a direct function of m. A false positive event occurs when v(f, g) = 1
or m > th, given that the underlying accelerometer (f(t)) and microphone (g(t))
signals do not match.
There are two cases available in Eq. (5.6): i < n (the first and third terms in the
max) and i = n (the middle term in the max). The former case is simple; the final
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value of m is by definition a scaled-down version of the mijs. A lower value of m will
lower the false positive rate.
The latter case considers n segments (phonemes) composing the command. A false
positive event occurs when m = 1/n
n∑
k=1
mk,k > th, given that f(t) does not match
g(t). In the case of phonemes false positives, one can view all mi,js as being drawn
from the distribution PM(mi,j) = PM(M = mi,j|fi 6= gj), where the 6= operator indi-
cates non-matching; the false positive rate is simply PM(M > th|fi 6= gj). The false
positive rate of the whole command is then equal to PM(m) = PM(
∑n
k=1mk,k/n >
th|f 6= g). Our objective reduces to showing that PM(m) decays as n increases (i.e.,
more non-matching phonemes are added to the command).
The distribution PM(M = mij) is an arbitrary one that only satisfies two condi-
tions. First, it is bounded since the values of mi,j are limited to the interval [0, 1].
Second, the matching threshold, th, is larger than the mean of the distribution such
that th > E(mi,j). The empirical false positive distribution P (mi,j) that we estimated
in Section 5.7 satisfies both conditions.
We know from the Hoeffding bound that since mi,j are bounded, PM(
∑n
k=1mk,k−
n.E(m) > t) ≤ e−2t
2








mnk > th) ≤ e−2n(th−E(m))
2
. (5.8)
The left-hand side of Eq. (5.8) is simply the false positive rate of the command
composed of n non-matching phonemes. Clearly, this false positive rate decays expo-
nentially fast in n. Our results from the user study further confirm this analysis.
5.9 Evaluation
We now evaluate the efficacy of VAuth in identifying common voice assistant com-
mands, under different scenarios and for different speakers. We demonstrate that
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VAuth delivers almost perfect matching accuracy (True Positives, TPs) regardless of
its position on the body, user accents, mobility patterns, or even across different lan-
guages. Moreover, we elaborate on the security properties of VAuth, demonstrating
its effectiveness in thwarting various attacks. Finally, we report the delay and energy
consumption of our wearable prototypes.
5.9.1 User Study
Table 5.3: The list of commands.6
Command Command
1. How old is Neil deGrasse
Tyson?
16. Remind me to buy coffee at
7am from Starbucks
2. What does colloquial mean?
17. What is my schedule for
tomorrow?
3. What time is it now in Tokyo? 18. Where’s my Amazon package?
4. Search for professional
photography tips
19. Make a note: update my
router firmware
5. Show me pictures of the
Leaning Tower of Pisa
20. Find Florence Ion’s phone
number
6. Do I need an umbrella today?
What’s the weather like?
21. Show me my bills due this
week
7. What is the Google stock price? 22. Show me my last messages.
8. What’s 135 divided by 7.5?
23. Call Jon Smith on
speakerphone
9. Search Tumblr for cat pictures
24. Text Susie great job on that
feature yesterday
10. Open greenbot.com
25. Where is the nearest sushi
restaurant?
11. Take a picture
26. Show me restaurants near my
hotel
12. Open Spotify 27. Play some music
13. Turn on Bluetooth 28. What’s this song?
14. What’s the tip for 123 dollars? 29. Did the Giants win today?
15. Set an alarm for 6:30 am
30. How do you say good night in
Japanese?
To support the conclusions derived from our model, we conducted a detailed user
study of the VAuth prototype with 18 users and under 6 different scenarios. We
tested how VAuth performs at three positions, each corresponding to a different form
of wearable (Fig. 5.4) eyeglasses, earbuds, and necklace. At each position, we tested
two cases, asking the user to either stand still or jog. In each scenario, We asked
the participants to speak 30 phrases/commands (listed in Table 5.3). These phrases
represent common commands issued to the “Google Now” voice assistant. In what
follows, we report VAuth’s detection accuracy (TPs) and false positives (FPs) when




























Figure 5.11: The detection accuracy of VAuth for the 18 users in the still position.































Figure 5.12: The energy levels of the outlier users (in Fig. 5.11c) compared to average
users. The circles represent commands of the outlier users that VAuth fails to match.
personally identifiable information from the individuals, and the data collection was
limited to our set of commands and posed no privacy risk to the participants. As
such, our user study meets the IRB exemption requirements of our institution.
Still VAuth delivers high detection accuracy (TPs), with the overall accuracy rate
very close to 100% (more than 97% on average). This indicates most of the com-
mands are correctly authenticated from the first trial and VAuth does not introduce
a usability burden to the user. The false positive rate is 0.09% on average, suggest-
ing that very few signals will leak through our authentication. These false positive
events occur because the per-segment analysis of our matching algorithm removes
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all non-matching segments from both signals, which ensures the security properties
of VAuth. In these cases, when the remaining segments for the microphone signal
accidentally match what the user said and leak through VAuth, the voice recognition
system (Voice-to-Text) fails to pick them up as sensible voice commands. Fig. 5.11
shows the overall distribution of detection results for each scenario.
VAuth performs almost perfect in two wearable scenarios, eyeglasses and earbuds,
but has two outliers regarding the detection accuracy in the case of the necklace. We
looked into the commands that VAuth fails to recognize and found they happen when
there are significant energy dips in the voice level. Fig. 5.12 reports the energy levels
of the voice sessions for our two outlier users compared to the average across users.
This suggests both participants used a lower (than average) voice when doing the
experiments which did not generate enough energy to ensure the authentication.
Mobility We asked the participants to repeat the experiments at each position
while jogging. Our algorithm successfully filters the disturbances introduced by mov-
ing, breathing and VAuth’s match accuracy remains unaffected (see Fig. 5.13). In
fact, we noticed in certain cases, such as for the two outliers observed in our previous
experiments, the results are even better. We studied the difference between their
samples in the two scenarios and found both accelerometer and microphone received
significantly higher energy in the jogging scenario even after we filtered out the sig-
nals introduced by movement. One explanation is users are aware of the disturbance
introduced by jogging and try to use louder voice to compensate. This observation is
consistent across most of our participants, not just limited to the two outliers.
Language We translated the list of 30 commands into four other languages —
Arabic, Chinese, Korean and Persian — and recruited four native speakers of these
languages. We asked the participants to place and use VAuth at the same three


























Figure 5.13: The detection accuracy of VAuth for the 18 users in the moving position.






























Figure 5.14: The detection accuracy of VAuth for the 4 different languages.
VAuth prototype was trained on English phonemes (Section 5.6.3). VAuth delivers
almost perfect detection accuracy, except for one case, with the user speaking Korean
when wearing eyeglasses. The Korean language lacks nasal consonants, and thus does
not generate enough vibrations through the nasal bone [113].
5.9.2 Security Properties
In Section 5.4, we listed three types of adversaries against which we aim to protect
the voice assistant systems. VAuth can successfully thwart attacks by these adversaries
136


























through its multi-stage matching algorithm. Table 5.4 lists the protections offered
by VAuth when the user is silent and actively speaking. Here, we use the evaluation
results in Section 5.9 to elaborate on VAuth’s security features for each attack scenario
and both cases when the user is silent and speaking.
Silent User When the user is silent, VAuth completely prevents any unauthorized
access to the voice assistant. In Section 5.7.3, we evaluate the false positive rate of
VAuth mistakenly classifying noise while the user is silent for all English phonemes. We
show that VAuth has a zero false positive rate. When the user is silent, the adversary
cannot inject any command for the voice assistant, especially for scenarios A and B of
Section 5.4. There is an exception, however, for scenario C; an adversary can employ
a very loud sound to induce vibrations at the accelerometer chip of VAuth. Note that,
since the accelerometer only senses vibrations at the z-axis, the attacker must make
the extra effort to direct the sound wave perpendicular to the accelerometer sensing
surface. Next, we will show that beyond a cut-off distance of 30cm, very loud sounds
(directed at the z-axis of the accelerometer) do not induce accelerometer vibrations.
Therefore, to attack VAuth, an adversary has to play a very loud sound within less
than an arm’s length from the user’s body — which is highly improbable.
We conduct experiments on the cut-off distances in two scenarios: the first with
VAuth exposed and the second with VAuth covered with cotton clothing. Fig. 5.15
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Figure 5.15: The magnitude of the sensed over-the-air vibrations by the accelerometer
as a function of the distance between the sound source and the accelerometer.
reports how the accelerometer chip of VAuth reacts to over-the-air sound signals of
different magnitudes at different distances. In each of these scenarios, we played a
white noise at three sound levels:7 2x, 4x and 8x the conversation level at 70dB, 82db
and 90dB, respectively. The noise is directed perpendicularly to the sensing surface
of the accelerometer. Fig. 5.15a shows the recorded magnitude of the accelerometer
signal as a function of the distance between the sound source and VAuth when it is
exposed. As evident from the plots, there is a cut-off distance of 30cm, where VAuth’s
accelerometer cannot sense even the loudest of the three sound sources. For the other
two sounds, the cut-off distance is 5cm. Beyond the cut-off distance, the magnitude
of the recorded signal is the same as that in a silent scenario. This indicates that
an adversary cannot inject commands with a high sound level beyond some cut-off
distance. These results are consistent with the case of VAuth covered with cotton, as
shown in Fig. 5.15b. The cut-off is still 30cm for the loudest sound. It is worth noting
that the recorded signal at the microphone does not change magnitude as drastically
as a function of the distance. At a distance of 1m from the sound source, the audio
7http://www.industrialnoisecontrol.com/comparative-noise-examples.htm
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Figure 5.16: The flow of the mangling voice analysis.
signal loses at most 15dB of magnitude.
Speaking User On the other hand, the adversary may try to launch an attack on
the voice assistant system when the user is actively speaking. Next, we show how
VAuth can successfully thwart the stealthy attacks in scenario A. We will show, in the
most extreme case scenario, how VAuth can completely distinguish the accelerometer
samples of the voice spoken by the user from the reconstructed sound of the same
command, even when the reconstructed voice sounds the same to the human listener
as the original one.
Vaidya et al. [19, 104] presented an attack that exploits the gap between voice
recognition system and human voice perception. It constructs mangled voice segments
that match the MFCC features of an injected voice command. An ASR engine can
recognize the command, but not the human listener. This and similar attacks rely on
performing a search in the MFCC algorithm parameter space to find voice commands
that satisfy the above feature.
Performing an exhaustive search on the entire parameter space of the MFCC gen-
eration algorithm is prohibitive. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of VAuth
against such an attack, we consider its worst-case scenario. Fig. 5.16 shows the eval-
uation flow. For each of the recorded command of the previous section, we extract
the MFCCs for the full signal and use them to reconstruct the voice signal. Fi-
nally, we execute VAuth over the reconstructed voice segment and the corresponding
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accelerometer sample to test for a match.
We fixed the MFCC parameters as follows: 256 samples for the hop time, 512
samples for the window time, and 77 as the length of the output coefficient vector.
We vary the number Mel filter bands between 15 and 30. At 15 Mel filter bands, the
reconstructed voice command is similar to what is reported in existing attacks [104].
At 30 Mel filter bands, the reconstructed voice command is very close to the original;
it shares the same MFCCs and is easily identifiable when played back.
The question that we aim to address is whether reducing the sound signal to a
set of features and reconstructing back the original signal preserves all the acoustic
features needed for VAuth to perform a successful matching with the corresponding
accelerometer signal. If not, then the reconstructed sound will not even match the
voice it originated from. Therefore, any mangled voice will not match the user’s
speech as measured by VAuth, so that VAuth could successfully thwart the attack.
In all cases, while the original microphone signal matches accelerometer signals
near perfectly as indicated before, the reconstructed sound failed to match the ac-
celerometer signal in 99% of the evaluated cases. Of 3240 comparisons (2 Mel filter
band lengths per command, 90 commands per user and 18 users), the reconstructed
sound matched only a handful of accelerometer samples, and only in cases where we
used 30 Mel filter bands. Indeed, those sound segments were very close to the original
sound segment that corresponds to the matched accelerometer samples. To constitute
an attack, the mangled voice segment is not supposed to originate from the sound the
user is speaking, let alone preserving discernible acoustic features. This demonstrates
that VAuth matches the time-domain signals in their entirety, thwarting such attacks
on the voice assistant and recognition systems.
Last but not least, we tested VAuth with the set of mangled voice commands8 used
by Carlini et al. [19]. We asked four different individuals to repeat these commands
8http://www.hiddenvoicecommands.com/
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while wearing VAuth. The accelerometer samples corresponding to each command do
not match their mangled voice counterparts.
In scenario B, an attacker also fails to overcome VAuth’s protection. We indicated
earlier in Section 5.7.2 and in this section that VAuth successfully distinguishes the
phonemes and commands of the same user. We further confirm that VAuth can
differentiate the same phoneme or command across different users. Moreover, even
if the user is speaking and the adversary is replaying another sound clip of the same
user, VAuth can differentiate between the microphone and accelerometer samples and
stop the attack. Finally, VAuth might result in some false positives (albeit very low).
As explained earlier, these false positive take place because the remaining segments
after the per-segment stage of VAuth match, and thus do not represent a viable attack
vector. It is worth noting that VAuth could use a more stringent classifier that is tuned
to force the false positive rate to be 0. This will come at the cost of usability but
could be preferable in high-security situations.
5.9.3 Delay and Energy
We measure the delay experienced at the voice assistant side and the energy con-
sumption of the wearable component, using our prototype. As shown in Fig. 5.2,
VAuth incurs delay only during the matching phase: when VAuth uploads the ac-
celerometer and microphone signals to the remote service and waits for a response.
According to our test on the same list of 30 commands, we found that a successful
match takes 300–830ms, with an average of 364ms, while an unsuccessful match takes
230–760ms, with an average of 319ms. The response time increases proportionally to
the length of the commands, but matching a command containing more than 30 words
still takes less than 1 second. We expect the delay to decrease further if switching
from our Matlab-based server to a full-fledged web server.
When the wearable component transmits accelerometer signals, it switches be-
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Figure 5.17: Current levels of the prototype in the idle and active states.
tween two states: idle state that keeps the connection alive and active state that
actually transmits the data. We connected our prototype to the Monsoon power
monitor and recorded the current levels of the prototype in these two states when
powered by a fixed voltage (4V). Fig. 5.17 illustrates the changes of the current levels
when our prototype switches from idle to active and then back to idle. We observed
that under active state, our prototype consumes as much as 31mA, while under idle
state, it only consumes an average of 6mA. Most of the energy is used to keep the
Bluetooth connection and transmit data (in the active state) — the energy consumed
by the accelerometer sensor is almost negligible.
Assuming the user always keeps the wearable open at daytime and sends 100 voice
commands per day (each voice command takes 10 seconds). Our prototype consumes
6.3mA on average. This might even be an overestimation since 90% of the users issue
voice commands at most once per day according to our survey. A typical 500mAh
Li-Ion battery used by wearables (comparable to a US quarter coin) can power our
prototype for around a week. 80% of the participants in our usability survey think
they have no problem with recharging the wearable on a weekly basis. We conducted
all the analyses on our prototype which directly utilizes off-the-shelf hardware chips
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without any optimization, assuming that VAuth is provided as a standalone wear-
able. If incorporated into an existing wearable device, VAuth will only introduce an
additional energy overhead of less than 10mAh per day.
5.10 Discussion
In our prototype implementation, we enforce the same policy for all voice com-
mands: if the authentication passes, execute else drop the command. However, one
can implement customized policy for different commands. For example, some com-
mands, such as time/weather inquiry, are not privacy/security-sensitive, so VAuth
can execute them directly without going through additional authentication process;
other commands, such as controlling home appliances might be highly sensitive, and
hence VAuth should promptly warn the user instead of simply dropping the command.
This can be implemented by extending the Intent interception logic in our prototype
implementation, making VAuth react differently according to different Intent actions,
data, and types.
Besides its excellent security properties, VAuth has a distinct advantage over ex-
isting technologies — it is wear-and-use without any user-specific, scenario-dependent
training. Although we used machine learning to facilitate matching decision in our
algorithm, we only trained once (on English phonemes of a test user) and then applied
it in all other cases. Our evaluation demonstrates that VAuth is robust to changes in
accents, speed of speech, mobility, or even languages. This significantly increases the
usability of VAuth.
5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed VAuth, a system that provides continuous au-
thentication for voice assistants. We demonstrated that even though the accelerom-
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eter information collected from the facial/neck/chest surfaces might be weak, it con-
tains enough information to correlate it with the data received via microphone. VAuth
provides extra physical assurance for voice assistant users and is an effective measure
against various attack scenarios. It avoids the pitfalls of existing voice authentica-
tion mechanisms. Our evaluation with real users under practical settings shows high
accuracy and very low false positive rate, highlighting the effectiveness of VAuth. In
future, we would like to explore more configurations of VAuth that will promote wider
real-world deployment and adoption.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions And Future Works
As mobile becomes the central theme of our digital consumer market, new tech-
niques have been continuously invented for, and introduced to the mobile platform. In
this dissertation, we have demonstrated the risks when these techniques are directly
imported and applied without being aware of the trust relationship in the mobile
ecosystem. Specifically, we focused on various communication interfaces that enable
the information and control flow of the current mobile ecosystem.
6.1 Conclusions
In Chapter II, we conducted an in-depth analysis on a client-side IPC interface,
Android Binder. According to our analysis of more than 100 vulnerabilities on this
surface, we discovered a common misconception of where the security boundary is
for Android system services — many may assume the security/trust boundary is at
the client-side public APIs, and whatever happens thereafter is free from obstruction
since it is already in the system zone. This misconception is understandable since
Android provides the convenient abstraction of AIDL and automatically generates
codes in the IPC stack. In other words, even though Android system services depend
heavily on IPC, the developers are likely to be agnostic of that. We addressed this
problem with BinderCracker, a precautionary testing framework that achieves auto-
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matic discovery of vulnerabilities. It supports context-aware fuzzing, automatically
resolves dependency across IPC transactions, and achieves 7x better effectiveness than
simple black-box fuzzing. We also highlighted the urgent need for attack attribution
for IPC-based attacks. Due to the lack of transparency, no one knows why a system
service crashed and who caused it. We proposed proper OS-level support by building
an OS-level runtime diagnostics tool on the binder surface. We believe it will be
essential for any in-depth runtime analysis. Our solutions are useful, practical, and
easily integratable in the development/deployment cycle of Android.
In Chapters III and IV, we demonstrated how to restrict the potential informa-
tion flow between apps by monitoring, characterizing and reducing the underlying
linkability across them. In Chapter III, we proposed the concept of DLG (Dynamic
Linkability Graph), which captures both the quality and quantity of the linkability
across apps. This allows us to measure the potential threat of unregulated aggrega-
tion during runtime and promptly warn users of the associated risks. We observed
how real-world apps abuse OS-level information and IPCs to establish linkability, and
proposed a practical countermeasure, LinkDroid. It provides runtime monitoring and
mediation of linkability across apps, introducing a new dimension to privacy protec-
tion on mobile device. Our evaluation with real users has shown that LinkDroid is
effective in reducing the linkability across apps and only incurs marginal overhead.
In Chapter IV, we further discussed an alternative solution, called Mask, in the user
level for the same problem of unregulated aggregation. It introduces a set of private
execution modes and give users options to maintain multiple isolated profiles of the
same app. Mask achieves this by enforcing user-level sandboxes and exploiting the dy-
namic linking process in Android. All user behaviors originate from the mobile apps,
either directly or indirectly. By enabling the proposed private execution modes which
isolate app usages at this very source, Mask provides a client-side solution without
requiring any change to the existing ecosystem.
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In Chapter V, we secured an increasingly popular human-machine interaction
channel, the voice channel, for mobile voice assistants. We proposed VAuth, a sys-
tem that provides continuous authentication for voice assistants. We demonstrated
that even though the accelerometer information collected from the facial/neck/ch-
est surface might be weak, it contains enough information to correlate it with the
data collected from microphone. VAuth provides extra physical assurance for voice
assistant users, effectively thwarts mangling voice attacks and successfully blocks
unauthenticated voice commands replayed by an attacker or impersonated by other
users, It avoids the pitfalls of existing voice authentication mechanisms and has a
distinct advantage over previous technologies — it is wear-and-use without any user-
specific, scenario-dependent training. Our evaluation with real users under practical
settings shows high accuracy and very low false positive rate, regardless of variations
in accents, mobility patterns (still vs. jogging), or even across languages (Arabic,
Chinese, English, Korean, Persian).
6.2 Future Directions
In this thesis, we elaborated on the challenges encountered in an emerging mobile
ecosystem. Many of our experiences can be reused when dealing with other interfaces
in the mobile ecosystem or similar interfaces in other domains, such as vehicular
networks and Internet of Things (IoTs). This opens up new directions for future
explorations.
Apps make use of various sensory data provided by the mobile OS. However, most
of the apps naively assume that the sensory data received is authentic. This may
cause severe privacy and security problems, not only to the users who are currently
using the app, but also to businesses running the app. For example, the location
information is utilized by many important/sensitive apps or services, for social, search
or authentication purposes. However, it is very easy to fake location data in current
147
mobile OSes and attackers can utilize this loophole to spam nearby users, exploit
mobile games (e.g., Pokemon GO), and commit frauds. Similar exploitations are
prevalent in the current mobile ecosystem and we believe this is an interesting problem
worthy of further exploration.
Many of the problems we discussed in this thesis also exist in other domains and
deserve more attention. For example, in-vehicle communications work on top of the
CAN (Controller Area Network) bus. Overwhelmed by the unprecedented trend of
Internet-powered in-vehicle applications, the CAN protocol is significantly outdated
in terms of security or privacy. Essentially, the CAN protocol provides neither built-in
security nor (serious) sanity checks on the messages transmitted through the network.
It has been demonstrated that any component with access to the CAN bus can in-
troduce severe physical security issues, putting the driver’s and passengers’ lives in
danger [21]. This calls for the design and implementation of precautionary testing, as
well as runtime diagnostic tools on the CAN interface. The vehicle should at least be
able to trace attacks to specific ECU (Electronic Control Unit). Another potential
direction is introducing linkability tracking/control to IoT devices. IoT devices serv-
ing each household and each person are predicted to grow very fast and soon become
untraceable. All the devices will be connected to Internet and uploading private data
that can be attributed to users. It will be essential to ensure that information from
multiple IoT devices should not be linkable unless there are legitimate needs, and
users should be given the options to opt out. Without a proper scheme of enforcing
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